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FOREWORD
SIno-Amerlcan relations were based on trade.
Because of the hazardous nature of this commercial
enterprise, however, an additional security was
established by treaty, Ihe treaty rights which the
United States and other Powers obtained from China in the
middle of the nineteenth century gave legal recognition
to the practise of encroaching upon China's administrative
and territorial entities.
It is the purpose of this study to present a
small aspect of the history of the administrative relations
between the United States and China. By taking three
specific phases the tariff, the judiciary, and communica-
tions as representative problems of the broader trend,
it will be possible to observe an evolutionary process
of development from 1842-1928.
1.
CHAPTER I.
CHINA AND THE POWERS, 1842 - 1928.
A. Encroachments on China's Administrative Integrity
The early relations beWeen China and the Powers
were primarily commercial. American merchants entered the
China trade at the end of the eighteenth century and
endeavored to fit their enterprise into the scheme of an
essentially hostile customer nation. For China in her
glorious Isolation merely tolerated foreign traders. The
sovereignty of the Manchu dynasty was not to be challenged
by the West before 1842 but it was the imposition of this
authority that was a continual source of irritation to the
esterners.
The Chinese had strict regulations for the control
of foreigners. The contempt they felt for the mercenary
1
merchants was manifested in these regulations. Imperial
decree had made Canton and Macao the only ports open for
trade. The Imperial Government had designated certain
1. K. 3. Latourette, ''The History of the Early Rel: tlons
Between the United States and China, " Connecticut
Academy of Arts and Sciences , XXII (1917), 19.
authorities to have dealings with the foreigners. The
Westerners had to live and trade In small areas allotted
to them by the Chinese, %*hich they were not allowed to
leave. With the exactions levied on foreign products and
the general corruption among Chinese officials, foreign
traders were working under adverse conditions.
The Westerners felt that this discrimination
plus the refusal of China to recognize their governments
was detrimental to trade. Moreover, an additional
Irritation was experienced in the administrative conflict
of 0 lental-Occldental law. The traders complained of
Chinese Jurisdiction, emphasizing the wide difference in
Eastern court procedure from Western. On the whole the
1
law systems were not too widely divergent. The Chinese
emphasized the result of an assault and the English
emphasized the intention of a crime. It was regrettable
that the legal issues concerning free intercourse on a
basis of mutual equality could not have been settled
during the test case of the Terranova Affair.
2
This case
of an American sailor's death by the Chinese authorities
1. H. B. Korse and H. P. MacNair, Far Easttrn International
Relations (Cambridge, 1931), p. 73.
2. K. S. Latourette, "The History of. the Early Relations
Between the United States and China," p. 63.
3.
for the allegedly accidental death of a Chinese woman
well Illustrated the legal position of foreigners in
China prior to the 1842 treaties.
The foreign merchants felt that some action
should be taken to establish diplomatic intercourse and
thus insure their collective security for trading by
opening more ports and expanding the volume of trade. An
opportunity was soon to present Itself. Merchants of all
nations, including the United States, supplied China with
opium to >?a.ln a favorable balance of trade. There was a
need for a China market commodity to offset the specie
basis of trade which resulted from China's not importing
foreign goods to an appreciable extent. The importation of
opium into China, howevc r, had been illegal and therefore
tax free since 1796 and was a profitable contraband product.
The opium Wars were solely between China and Great
Britain over the drug traffic.
3
* The Canton authorities had
overtly supported the trade since its prohibition, but in
1839 a sudden reform administration had seized all the
opium in Canton without warning. The lack of warning and
the subsequent loss of 36,000,000 worth of oolum was the
primary British objection. However, it was strictly Britain ! s
struggle because she had refused to give bond to the Chinese
1. K. 3. Latourette, "The History of the Early Relations
Between the United States and China," p. 110.
4.
Government not to introduce any more opium.
British gunboats quickly subdued the Chinese,
and a Treaty of Peace and Commerce x*as signed at Nanking
in 1842. It was incomprehensible to the Chinese that a
conquering power that had force would not use it to its
2
fullest extent. However, the seemingly mild Treaty of
Nanking granted the privilege of extraterritoriality but
did not settle the question of opium importation.
Whenever a British subject has reason to
complain of a Chinese he must first proceed
to the Consulate and state his grievance....
regarding the punishment of English criminals,
the English Government will enact the laws
necessary to attain that end, and the Consul
will be empowered to put them in force.... 3
Further concessions were exacted by the British. Consuls
were given a status to communicate on terms of equality
with Chinese officials, provision was made for the
Imperial Government to promulgate a "fair and regular
tariff of import and export customs and other dues;" and
4
four ip ore Chinese ports were opened to trade.
1. K. S. Latourette, "The History of the Early Relations
Between the United states and China, " p. 113.
2. R. Y. Gilbert, Muit's Wronfl China? (New York, 1927, p. 202.
3. W. W. Wllloughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China
(Baltimore, 1920), pp. 19-iiO.
4. G. N. Steiger, A History of the Far East (Boston, 1936),
p.53!
5When other nations saw Britain concluding a
treaty that would facilitate commerce i*lth China they
successfully opened negotiations themselves. The
treaties signed between China and the foreign Powers in
the next two years were known as the First Treaty
Settlement. They determined the Chinese-Western relations
until 1858 and represented the first measures of
administrative encroachment on China's Judicial and
revenue systems.
It has been contended that the United States
reaped profit 'vhlle the British fought the Opium '/ars. In
view of our commercial policy this is not a just accusation.
..'e would not Join in a forceful expedition for a privilege
that the American merchants had been willing to give up
voluntarily by signing the bond at the request of the
Chinese Government. Later we pledged ourselves to this
policy by declaring in the Treaty of 1844, opium to be
contraband.
The Am rican treaty was much better than the
British in obtaining privileges for its citizens. The
treaty definitely claimed extraterritorial Jurisdiction.
The American delegate, Cushing, had been Instructed to
support the doctrine that Americans in China should not be
subject to the laws and courts of China.
1
He asked for
1. W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China ,
p. 15.
6.
extraterritoriality on a basis of international lav; and
not as a concession from the Chinese. However, the legal
existence of extraterritorial rights rested entirely upon
concessions made by China in her treaties with the Western
Powers."*"
Subjects of China who may be guilty of any
criminal act towards citizens of the United
States shall be arrested and punished by the
Chinese authorities according to the laws of
China; and citizens of the United States who
may commit any crime in China shall be subject
to be tried and punished only by the Consul
or other public functionary of the United States,
thereto authorized according to the laws of the
United States. And in order to the prevention
of all controversy and disaffection, Justice
shall be equitably and impartially administered
on both sides.
2
All questions in regard to rights whether of
property or person arising between citizens of
the United States in China, shall be subject to
the Jurisdiction of, and regulated by the
authorities of their own government. And all
controversies occurring in China between
citizens of the United States and subjects of
any other Government shall be regulated by the
treaties existing between the United States and
such governments, respectively, without
interference on the part of China. 9
1. W. V. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China ,
p. 17.
2. W. M. Malloy, Treaties. Conventions, International Aots ,
Protocols, and Assignments between the United St- Lc s and
QtKeTTowers. I^6->L6u9 (Washington, l&iO), I, 2QS-Su3.
A Treaty of Peking signed by China and the
United States in 1880 further defined extraterritorial
privileges for the United States. Consular Jurisdiction
In civil cases was granted to American nationals.
When controversies arise in the Chinese
Empire between citizens of the United
States and subjects of His Imperial Majesty
which need to be examined and decided by the
public officers of the two nations, it is
agreed between the Governments of the United
States and China that such will be tried by
the proper official of the nationality of the
defendant. The properly authorized official
of the plaintiff's nationality, shall be freely
permitted to attend the trial and shall be ,
treated with the courtesy due to his position....
Another instance whereby the Powers violated
Chinese administration was in the creation of the Mixed
Court at Shanghai in 1864. The Court was to hear litigation
In both Chinese and Western law and Chinese and foreign
Jurists were to preside over the Court. Rules were
formulated and from 1876 on Jurisdiction was based on the
principle, "the cases tried by the official of the
defendants nationality...., the law administered will be the
law of the nationality trying the case.
1. . M. Malloy, Treaties , I, 240.
2. H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, Far Eastern International
Relations , p. 261.
8.
In theory, the laws of the Chinese Empire were
supreme and foreigners were bound to respect them. In
practise, foreigners were bound to respect Chinese law
only as it conformed to the laws of their home countries.
tbm difference was bound to create animosity. The American
Government, according to Secret -ry of State Seward, tried
to reconcile the theory and practise of the Kixed Court.
It does not seem necessary or possible to
abandon the simple proposition that our people
may be dealt with only in our own courts and
according to our own lavs. But so far as we
can hold language to the Chinese which will
indicate that \te stand upon their soil in an
attitude of respect with a determination to
sustain the government in the essential
attributes of soFereignty, . . . . I maintain only
the views of my government—that we ought not
to withhold such language nor fail to sustain
it in practise by appropriate action whenever
the occasion may arise. j-
The Treaty of 1844 was signed to facilitate peace,
amity, and commerce and contained the nucleus of the most-
favored-nation clause and prescribed a fixed tariff.
Citizens of the United States resorting to
China for the purpose of comrerce will pay
the duties of import and export prescribed
in the tariff which is fixed and made part of
this treaty. ' They shall In 10 case be subject
to other or higher duties than are or shall be
required of the people of any other nation
1. "J. V/. -iilloughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China ,
p. 42.
9.
whatever And If additional advantages
or privileges of whatever description, be
conceded hereafter by China to any other
nation, the United States, and the citizens
thereof, shall be entitled thereupon to a
complete, enual and impartial participation
in the same.l
France and Russia also concluded treaties vith
China at this time. In the Russian treaty a special
rebate of one third percent on regular import and export
2duties was pranted on overland and frontier trade. The
purpose of this measure was to encourage the overland
caravan trade. However, by the most-favored-natlon clause
other nations claimed the same privilege, and with the
event of the railroad, the Powers benefited by it greatly.
The Manchu throne accepted the new relationship
which had been established between China and the foreign
FowerB in these treaties but not all of China acceded.
Canton became the center of anti-foreign friction caused by
Chinese resentment and foreign violation of the treaty
3
rights.
1. H. kalloy, Treaties , I, 197.
2. J. Arnold, tariffs and Internal Taxes," China |
Commercial and Industrial Handbook (Washington, 1926),
pT 334.
3. G. 8. Steiger, A History of the . Far East , p. 538.
10.
As a result of dissatisfaction and the recourse
to forceful settlement, the foreign Powers signed the
Second Treaty Settlement between 1858-1860. This extended
foreign control over residence, trade, and diplomatic
representatives in Peking. The original treaties had
expired about this time, and the Chinese Government had
been inclined to refuse to sign renewals. Great Britain
and France won their rights by force in the Second Anglo-
French War, while the United States gained further eonoess
ions. through diplomacy.
In this Settlement the American Treaty clearly
stated the principle of the most- favored-nation treatment.
China's incompetence, then, would enable the Powers to
form a bloc against her through terras of this provision.^*
The contracting parties hereby agree that
3h raid at any time, the Ta T'sing I&aplre grant
to any nation, any right, privilege or f ivor,
connected either with navigation, commerce,
political or other Intercourse, which is not
conferred by this treaty, such right privilege
and favor shall at once freely inure to the
benefit of the United 3tates, its^publlc
officers, merchants and citizens.
1. C. C. Wang, «How China Recovered Tariff Autonomy/
Aneric^n Academy of Political and Social Scienc e,
CLII (November, 1930), 267.
2. M. HallPjr, Tr--.fi ties , I, 221.
11
Discontent with mi 8government and with China's
increasing contact with the West, religious fanaticism,
and revolutionary secret societies caused an uprising
ecainet the Manchus. China was disrupted by the T'aiping
Rebellion from 1850-1860. The Powers co-operated during
the rebellion to carry out the American policy of
supporting the Imperial authorities, thus staving off
dismemberment of the Empire which might have followed the
success of the T'aipingg.
The Revolutionists had threatened to seize the
Imperial administration at Shanghai and the Powers united
to prevent this action by further encroachment upon China's
administrative integrity. The Ar.trloan, British, and French
Consuls at Shanghai agreed to establish a Customs Office
under foreign control to collect the tariff of import and
export dues for the Imperial Government . The Hanchu ruler
approved of this action as an expedient measure. Continua-
tion of the collection then came about because the
arrangement proved satisfactory to both foreign traders and
the Chinese Government.
Foreign concessions and the experience of inter-
mittent warfare with France on her Southern boundary led
the Chinese Government to build telegraph lines and to
foster communications improvements within the Empire. The
1. H. H. Oowen and J. W. Hall, An Outline History of China
(New York, 1927), p. 293.
12.
first steam railroad was also constructed by the British
about this time. In the face of foreign development, the
Manchus endeavored to have a foreign policy th t would
prevent complete administrative control by treaty powers.
Hie Chinese Foreign Office issued a circular in 1878
explaining its policy. In general it agreed in the
efficacy of most-favored-nation treatment but complained
of the abuses in the system whereby nations would Interpret
concessions gained through the most- favored-nation clauses
to their own advantage.
The Smolre had never been restored to its supreme
position after the T'alping Rebellion. Dissension that had
existed within the Empire before it had assumed treaty
obligations was now accentuated. Anti-Manohu revolutionary
societies, robbery and brigandage, anti-Christian demonstra-
tions, and official corruption ware all significant factors
in the decadence of the Empire. The Manchus, however,
managed to maintain the respect of the West for three
decades after the Second Treaty Settlement in spite of
encroachments on their administrative and territorial
integrity and rampant domestic turmoil.
1 Finally the
Chinese-Japanese controversy over China's vassal state,
Korea, broke the feeble hold of Manohu prestige at home and
1. G. N. Steiger, History. of the Far East , p. 560.
13.
abroad
.
Japan had been trying to "open" Korea to
commercial enterprise ever since she started on her own
path of Westernization. The Japanese succeeded in signing
a commercial treaty with Korea in 1676. This treaty ifas
Japan's first step in expansion on the mainland. 1 From
this time on Japan worked toward destroying China*
s
suzerainty over Korea.
Western nations had contributed to China's
humiliation by Japan because they interfered in Korea by
signing commercial treaties, too, and thus they stimulated
anti-foreigniem and Chinese-Japanese rivalry. This rivalry
culminated in war in 1894. The period after the var marked
the ascendency of Japan as a Far Eastern Power and started
China on her precipitous courae of reform and revolt,
heightened by foreign aggression against her administrative
and territorial sovereignty.
The disgrace China had to bear after the Japanese
rwar brought forth an Immediate reaction. It started among
the educated classes with a demand for administrative
reform. The first expressions of dissatisfaction were in
the form of memorials to the throne containing proposals for
1. H. 3. Horse and H. F. MaoHalr, Far Sr. g tern Int bl saal
Relations, p. 389.
14.
reform and protests against ratification of the Treaty of
Shimonosekl. Societies to propagate reform were quickly
formed. The Infiltration of new Ideas Inevitably became
revolutionary and this movement \*as ably led by 3un Yat-3en,
chief of the revolutionary party.
Another phase of reform emphasized constitutional
revision. The Emperor, Kuang Hsu, became an adherent of
this mode of strengthening the Empire against foreign
encroachment. He tried to Institute the ohange by a aeries
of reform decrees In 1898. There was an element of pathos
in the failure of the Smperor's decrees. The haste which he
felt was necessary was, in reality, a mistalce. The entire
project was too ambitious for a man ignorant of administrative
procedure and unable to inspire followers. The program
proved to be too revolutionary for ancient Chinese tradition
to assimilate.
The reform decrees alarmed the Manchus who turned
to the Dowager Empress, Tzu Hsi, who favored the conservative
element at court. The Emperor, meanwhile, went too far
with his reform and planned a revolution which would dispose
of the Dowager's influence and destroy the conservative party.
Ihe Empress heard of the plot and immediately executed a
coup d'etat, dethroned the Emperor, and resumed the regency.
15,
China, emerging from ar with Japan, had to
contend with new encroachments on her sovereignty.
Private individuals backed by their governments exploited
China with the avidity of inseparable combinations. 1
The result of this merging of individual with
governmental lnt rests has been that matters
which would elsewhere be of merely comnereial
character, susceptible of Judicial determination
in case of dispute, are in China matters of
international political concern, for the
settlement of which the ultimate recourse is to
diplomatic notion. It is thus in a sense true
thnt the international status of the Chinese
Government is determined and conditioned by its
business contracts with individual foreign firms
or syndlcrtr
-q, scarcely if at all less than by
its formal Trer-tles with other Governments. 2
This situation was emphasised when China vai forced
to admit foreign capital to pay the indemnity to Japan and
was forced, al30, to grant territorial concessions to the
Powers who had helped lighten the 3himonosekl terms. A
double burden was thereby placed upon the defeated nation.
The first Power to {jet a lease was Germany, Klachow on
March 6, 1090. Bus sift leased Port Arthur, April 2; Britain
ooncerninr; China , 1894-1919 (Hew v-'ork, 19*1), 1, :dil.
'd, Ioid.
,
p. xv.
J. V
18.
leased Weihaiwei, April 10; France leased Kwang-chow wan,
June 9; and Britain obtained more land on the Kowloon
Peninsula.
While the scramble for concessions was going on
In 1898, the United States was busy with war with Spain.
The next year, when the question of the annexation of the
Philippines came before the American Government the islands
were looked upon by many as a base for the China trade.
The new imperialism in the United States was soon
to be applied to Ohina. Through the close relations among
the members of the American and British 3tate Department s,"*"
the American Secretary of State, John Hay, was persuaded to
send identic notes to the Po ers requesting their support
in upholding equal commercial opportunities in China. These
notes gave expression to the American heritage of the
principle of an open door for trade in China plus the so-
called co-operative policy to maintain it. The diplomacy
was enacted to prevent the probable partition of China
among the Powers who had received territorial concessions.
The Chinese Government was not invited to partake in the
correspondence.
"/hile Hay w&* announcing the Open-Door principle,
the Chinese Government was preparing to resist by force
1. A. • ;;rlswold, The b'ar astern Policy of the united
States (New York, 1938), pp. 64-63.
1?
further foreign aggression. A general spirit of unrest
was characterized by antl-forelgnlsra, anti-missionary
demonstrations, and anti-reformation activity. To promote
the impress 1 reactionary policy of preserving the Empire
by strengthening old institutions and denying further
foreign concessions, the throne encouraged roving Militia
bands and patrl jtic societies called Boxers. The movement
gained momentum and finally became dangerous to the life
and property of foreigners in China. "The legations ordered
the Impress to suppress the Boxers. This request, however,
was ignored.
The Manchu support of the anti-foreign movement
played into the hands of the Powers and presented a perfect
opportunity for then to enlarge their spheres of Influence.
Partition of China was again threatened and Hay sensed the
need for a more forceful measure of insuring commercial
equality. Accordingly, he sent a circular note to the Powers
July 3, 1900 ,declaring that it was the policy of the United
States, M to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
entity.. . .and safeguard for all the world the principle of
equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese
iftpire. "i±
1. Or. N . 3teiger, A HisLory of the Far p. 694.
18.
The Hay statement gradually assumed the
character! sties of an American policy, a means of defense
for China. It meant the intervention by the United States
in a region where American interests were always
comparatively small. The United States was thereby
committed to a policy it could hardly hope to defend in
view of the American public's reluctance to use force and
the repercussion of European realpolitik in China.
Meanwhile suspicion had been aroused in China when
foreign marines and naval forces we :*e landed to protect the
legations and foreign nationals. The War Party at court
succeeded in declaring; a state of war between China and the
out3ide itforld. In the ensuing conflict, atrocities were
committed by both sides but the foreign forces were
victorious. Officials in the Central and Southern Provinces,
notoriously anti-Manchu, refused to obey war orders from
Peking and this neutrality kept the Boxer Rebellion from
becoming of greater proportion. The United States joined
an Allied expedition to relieve the besieged legations in
Peking and this punicive force brought the uprising to an
end. The Powers then united to impose a diplomatic settle-
ment upon the Chinese Government for the damage done by
the Boxers.
The Povcrs sirned a Pe^ce Protocol !-rith China In
10.
1901. By the terras of this agreement, an Indemnity of
four hundred and fifty millions of Halkwan Taela was
charged to China.
1
A bond issue was floated to pay the
indemnity, security for the bonds being assigned to
different sources of national revenue. Terms of the
Protocol wore lightened for China by the United States
in 1908 when Congress adopted a resolution providing for
the remission of a portion of the American share of the
Boxer indemnity
. Upon final adjudication it was found that
the claims of American nationals totaled less than the
apportioned amount of the indemnity. The remittance was
a gesture of friendship to set up a fund for the education
of Chinese youth.
The British signed a treaty with China in 1902
revising commercial treaties as had been provided in the
Boxer Protocol. The United States and Japan followed with
similar treaties a year later. Terms of these treaties
were of three types: in the interest of general trade; for
the reform of the Chinese Government; consideration for
the interests of the United States, Gre^t Britain and Japan.
1. J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties , I, 300,
H. B. Morpe and H. F. MacNpir, Far Eastern /> onal
Help tlon-q, p. 495.
20
In the American Treaty, proviaion was made for
the abolition of likln. This tax had been detrimental to
the development of China 1 8 internal trade as well as a
source of annoyance to the Powers. ''Likin" (meaning
contribution of a thousandth, i.e. one-tenth of one percent)
./as a tax imposed on goods on inland transit. Its original
purpose had been to mett the expenditures of the T'alping
Kebellion. Likln stations were plaoed at all large tov;ns
and along the main routes of land and water trade. A
provincial responsibility, generally colleooed by the military
governor, the tax was a source of Irritation to foreign
merchants. Faulty imposition rendered likin most severe
on railway lines where the specified weight of goods was
recorded and thus the practise of mutual "adjustments"
between trader and likin official were made cumbersome.
The United States allowed China compensation for abolishing
this means of revenue:
....The Government of the United States in return,
consents to allow a surtax, in exoesB of the
tariff rates for the time bein& in force, to
be imposed on foreign goods imported by
citizens of the United States and on Chinese
produce destined for export abroad or coast-
wise. It Ifl clearly understood that in no
case shall the surtax on foreign goods exoeed
one and one half time8 the import duty leviable
1. J. Arnold, "Tariff*? and Internal Taxes", p. 339.
21
in terms of the final Protocol signed by
China and the Povrers....!
America was dictating administrative policy to
China that she was treaty bound to uphold. Nevertheless,
the principle of Chinese sovereignty was duly accredited.
Nothing in this article is Intended to interfere
with the inherent right of China to levy such
other taxes as are not in conflict with its
provisions.... 2
The promise of relinquishing extraterritoriality
was Included in this trnnty. China and the Po--<rrs had been
in dispute over law and Jurisdiction since the beginning
of the nineteenth century.
The (lovernment of China having expressed a
strong desire to reform its Judicial syst<
and to bring it Into accord with that of the
Western nations, the United States agrees to
give every assistance to such reform and will
also be prepared to relinquish extraterritoriality
rights when satisfied that the state of the
Chinese laws, the arrangements for their
administration and oth^r conditions war ant it
in so doing. . . . <->
Accordingly, Chinese laxv reform cornmenoed as a
fulfillment of the term a of the Treaties of 1902 and 1903.
1. ». ;:. ..alloy, Treaties, I, :363.
! . Loo, clt .
3. Ibid. . p. 269.
Legal reform was to be a gradual process. A criminal code
was promulgated in 1907. 1 A body of Rules for the
application of Foreign Laws was later formulated. In
keeping with its power, the Congress of the United States
tried to correct the evils of the extraterritorial system
in China by oreating the United States Court for China in
1906. This Court had exclusive Jurisdiction in all oases
and Judicial proceedings that came within the scope of
the extraterritoriality system.
The surface reform instituted by the Throne was
farcical. Letting the Empress and her court return after
the Peace Protocol was signed was a mistake for which China
•aid have to pay in ml aery and suffering. The fad for
constitutions and codes of lav/ that the Throne promulgated
in the last days of its existence was mistaken for the
represent a Give attitude of the Chinese mind. On the other
hand, reformers and many high ranking officials wore
sincerely desirous of having a constitutional monarchy and
wanted neither revolution nor reaction.
1. H. 3. '4uigley, "Extraterritoriality in China",
American Journal of International Law , XX (January,
19M J, #L.
. H. /. Gilbert, '.flint «g Wron,^ ;ith Chin*?*, p. 23".
23.
Yet Revolutionary activity was being oarrled out
all the time by Sun Y- t-3cn and his followers. A s the
prestige of the Manchus began to fall after the Boxer
Revolt, the aroused patriotism of the people became more
and more favorable to revolution.* Failure of the revolt
plus the helplessness of China In 1904, when Japan and
Russia fought on her soil, convinced the most conservative
that the way to avoid national ruin was through reor^anlza-
tlon and the adoption of western ideas.
The opening decade of the twentieth century in
China was characterized by reform, revolt, and revolution.
The movement for constitutional government plus the decrying
Manchu dynastic authority in Peking were supplemented by
agitation for provlncipJL autonomy in the South and '/est.
The provinces were resisting the Central Governm-- nt 1 s
railway policy of nationalization. They objected to the
strength the Manonus would receive from foreign loans, the
centralized railway system, and the loss of revenue that
they would experience in this system.
Passive resistance in the form of a strike aaalnst
1. L. b. Hsu, 3un Yat-Sen His Poll i al and .Social gdgag
(Los Angles, I9u7>), p. 59.
2. K. S. Latourette, The Chinese. Their History and Culture
(New York, 1934;, p. 427.
24.
the railroad project in Szechwan province initiated the
revolution. Revolutionary plots x^rere then uncovered in
many of the provinces and fighting and rioting broke out.
?ha persistence of the revolutionaries, the conservatism of
the Manchus, and the neutrality of the Powers in refraining
from making a loan to the Empire brought about the downfall
of the Manchu dynasty in 1911.
A Republic was proclaimed for China and Yuan
Shlh-k'al a former Mr.nchu official was elected president.
Yuan's election as permanent executive was a conservative
triumph because the Revolutionary Provisional Parliament
had been dominated by Sur Yat-SenU Nationalist P rty. The
Nationalists objected to Yuan Shih-k 1 ai 1 s loan policy -ith
the foreign b'mkinr groups. This was the Reorganization
Loan Agreement from which the American Bonking; Group with-
drew its support because Wilson considered it to be a threat
to the administrative independence of China. Though
Parliament and the provinces protested the loan, Yuan
succeeded in forcing the Nationalists to retire from the
Government and he proceeded to set up dictatorial power.
The Kuomintang (National People*s Party) continued as an
active political party in the south and awaited the opportunity
for seizing control of the government.
25.
G. The Chinese Republic and Afli inistrative Into. ;rity
The war in Europe destroyed the balance of pover
In the Far ICast and substituted for It American-Japanese
antagonism. 1 Vfhile the leading British trade suffered
during the ^ar, Japanese and American commercial enterprise
prospered. Japan ,howevHr, added territorial and administrative
aggrandizement to her commercial policy by seizing the
German possessions in Shantung.
The Japanese presented the government of China
"ith an ultimatum of twenty-one demands on January 18, 1915,
These demands were for special oonoesslons and privileges
for Japan in Shantung, drawn vcp in five groups that brought
forth an immediate note of protest from the United States.
This note had given Japan hope, however, that America would
Inaugurate a China policy more In keeping with Japan's
interests in China. For in it, Bryan had recognized, "that
territorial contiguity creates special relations between
2
Japan and those districts, H to which she claimed rights.
The Chinese Government, "with a view to preserving
the peace of the Far East, hereby accepts, with the exception
1. A. W. Oriewoldg Ffl r Eastern Policy of the i Tn:ted 3t . tea ,
p. 176.
2. Ipid. , p. 192.
26.
of those five articles of Group V postponed for later
negotiations, all the articles h1 China had successfully
eluded politic
-1 vassalage by violating the pledge of
secrecy and informing the United States of the Ultimatum. 2
3uch a step had given her the moral courage to refuse the
fifth category (with the exception of an article concerning
capital for railways, mines, and dockyards) before the
United States had sent a second warning to Tokyo. In its
second note the policy of the United States seemed to be
stiffening
.
....that it cannot recognize any agreement
or undertaking which has been entered into
or which may be entered into between the
(Jove ^nmonts of China and Japan impairing the
treaty rights of the United States and its
citizens in China, the political or
territorial integrity of the Republic of
China, or the international policy rel tlve
to China commonly known as the Open-Door Policy.
Tliis was the first expression of the famous non-
recognition policy. Drafted by Lansing, it accomplished
it | purpose, made Japan doubt the free reign of the Bryan
1. A. W« Srisvold, Far Eastern Policy of the United States ,
p. 193.
2. Paul Blrdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York,
1941), p. 86.
3. J. V. A. MaoMurray, Treatie s, II, 1^36.
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note and led Tokyo to feel the need of an understanding
with the United States concerning China. 1 Japan, meanwhile,
had assured herself a place at the Peace Conference by
signing the Declaration of London with England, France, and
Russia, agreeing not to make a separate peace.
China, too, was concerned with attending the Peace
Conference. Entering the war with the Allies, however,
was more than the simple reply to Wilson's call to the
2
flenocr icies. Public opinion on the ar wr-s divided lB
China. The Peking Government wanted financial assistance
and treaty revision from the Powers as the price for China's
entrance. Chinese merchants were opposed to war because
trade as a neutral nation was extremely profitable.
Kuomlntang leaders feared the suppression of constitutionalism
and control by the militarists if war were declared. However,
China's hopes for treaty revision at the Conference pre-
dominated. The President of China disregarded a suggestion
reform
by the United States that internal/was of prime importance
for China, dismissed Parliament, and declared war against
the Central Powers August 14, 1917.
1. A. W. Griswold, Far Astern Policy of the United ^
p. 195.
2. Ibid . , p. 197.
3. R. T. Pollard, China's *'orei,m Relations
(New York, 1933),
p. 10.
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Trfo years later the Chinese delegates attended
the Paris Conference presenting a united front but not
representing a united nation, for both North and South had
reconoiled differences merely to attend the Conference. 1
China had one objective and one purpose, restoration of
Germany's possessions and protection from Japan. 2 The
hope was also expressed that the Conference
-rould take
steps lending to the eventual removal of other foreign
restrictions upon China's sovereignty. A list of questions
for readjustment was submitted calling for the renunciation
of all spheres of influence or interest, the withdrawal of
foreign troops and police, foreign post offices and agencies
for wireless and telegraphic conmmle-ttion, the abolition
of consular Jurisdiction, the relinquishment of the leased
territories, and the restoration of foreign concessions and
3
settlements and tariff autonomy.
Wilson sounded Lloyd George on a proposal that
all Po/ers forego their special rights in China but the
1. H. F. MaoNair, "Political History of China Under the
Republic, " American Academy of Political and social
Science , CLII (November, 1930), 217.
2. . B. Morse and H. F. MacHair, Far Eastern International
Relations
, p. 602.
3. Ibid.
,
p. 603.
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British Government did not agree. when the case of
Shantung came up for discussion, the legal and diplomatic
strength of the Japanese claim, plus the bargaining
power of the race question in the League, were potent
enough to defeat China.
^
News of the Shantung decision brought forth a
student and coolie demonstration of protest in China. The
defeat was a humiliation for both North and South but it
was to have a positive effect on Southern Nationalism.
Increasing dissatisfaction In the Southern Provinces where
republican and constitutional thought was inclined to be
radical had led to the convocation of the members of the
Peking Parliament at Canton in 1920. The Canton Government
then sought to obtain de facto recognition from the foreign
Powers and the Canton President, Sun Yat-3en, Issued a
manifesto claiming the legitimacy of the Canton regime to
the world at large.
Constitutional development had been retarded in
2
China from lack of executive energy and political leadership.
In actual practise the name Republic had been given to a
conglamoration of governments from bandit gangs to representative
1. Paul Birdeall, Versailles , p. 109.
2. V/. V/. Willoughby, Constitutional government in
China.
(Washington, 1922), p. 33.
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1
regional bodies. The central theme in Chinese history
of this tine was the evolution of Nationalism. The South
did not consider that the Resolution had been completed.
fhe Government at Canton adopted the basic principles of
2
Sun Yat-3en*s Sgn Mln doctrine (Three People's doctrine).
It contained the three principles to guide the revolution
and set up a republic in China. They were nationalism,
democraoy, and economic llvllhood. The economic well being
of the people was a government obligation to provide food,
clothing, shelter, and transportation according to their
needs. Democracy, it was hoped,would evolve from three
political stages of military dictatorship, political
tutelage, and constitutional government. Nationalism
expressed reslstence to foreign aggression and an opportunity
for treaty revision to re-gain international equality among
the Powers.
The foreign program of the Nationalist Party was
based on the principle of Nationalism. The objective was
not antl-foreignisra but pro-abrogation of unequal treaties.
Treaty revision on the basis of reciprocity and equality
U P. M. A. Llnebarger, The China of Chiang K *al-shek
(Boston, 1941), p. 4.
2. V. 7. Willoughby, Constitutional government In China
(Washington 1922), p. 33.
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was desired. By unequal treaties, the Nationalists meant
those which denied the fundamental rights of a free and
sov reign state, granted leases permitting foreign nations
to exercise dominion in Chinese territory, deprived China
of the regulation and control of Customs and exempted
foreigners from the Jurisdiction of Chinese laws and courts.
It was impossible to separate the problem of Internal
reform from the problem of foreign treaties because of their
interlocking nature.
The Washington Conference in 1922 marked a highlight
in the relations between China and the Po ^rs. China asked
for treaty revision in accordance with the Nationalist aims
as she had in 1019. The hope and promise for revision and
administrative autonomy reouested in 1922 were to become
Involved in domestic turmoil of the post-Conference period.
China experienced violent civil war from 1925-1927. Anti-
foreign agitation became active in this endeavor to bring
China back to her full sovereign position.
The Revolution to which Sun Yat-Sen had devoted
his life was greatly strengthened by popular demonstrations
between Chinese and foreigners. Radical labor organizers
led strikes and instigated boycotts against the British and
Japanese in 1925.
The textile mill strikes of this year were both
32
political and economic. They were associated with anti-
foreignlsra and were also protestations against the foul
working conditions imposed by the British and Japanese
mill owners. The student agitation against Tuan Qii-Jui , s
(pro-Japanese) Peking Government was an accusation against
imperialism. That the executive did not suppress the
agitation had an important effect In Shanghai. H re strikers
were dispersed when the Settlement police fired into the
crowd and killed several Chinese.
The Chinese Government seized upon this "massacre"
as a chance to re-open a diplomatic campaign for the ful-
fillment of old demands and to bring about the re-ad Jus tinent
1
of treaty relations on the basis of national desires.
The Peking Government sent a note to the Power s demanding}
the right of Chinese laborers to vote for the appointment
of a Chinese member on the Hongkong legislative staff; the
return of the Mixed Court at Shanghai and Chinese representa-
tion on the Municipal Council of the International Settlement;
and a request for treaty revision and the abolition of
extra-torrltoriality. the attitude of the Powers in response
to tliis note of June 24, 1925, was generally
conciliatory
1. E. 0. Hauser, Shanghai; City for Sale (New
York, 1940),
p. 155.
33
as cm be seen from Britain's turning her concessions in
Hankow and Kluklang over to the Nationalists and the Powers
preparing to convene the tariff conference and extraterrito-
riality commission as provided at Washington in 1922.
^his same year a re-organization conference was
held in an endeavor to bring Sun Yat-Sen (Canton) and
Chang Tso-lin (Manchuria) to the support of Tuan Chi- Jul
(Peking). The plan failed with the death of Sun, and the
Manchurian war lord withdrei*. Civil war resumed in
Northern China, and the Manchurian tuchun succeeded in
defe ting the Peking forces. Civil Government was suspended
in Peking, and a military dictatorship was established under
Chang-Tso-lin.
Meanwhile the N.-itionallst army captured Nanking
on their march northward from Canton. While troops of the
Peking Government were evacuating the city, units of the
Nationalist army attacked foreigners and foreign property.
1
This incident caused a breach between the Moderates and
Radicals in the Nationalist Party. The friction with the
Moscow Communists in the Kuomlntang had been coming since
1926. In January of that year, the Nationalist General
-Chiang K»ai-shek broke relations with his Russian adviser
1. CP. Howland, Survey of American Foreign Relatic
(New Haven, 1930), p. 139.
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Borodin. In March there was an anti-Communist purge in
Canton but by the next month money was advanced by Borodin
to win Chiang back temporarily. The Government moved to
J
^ .nl:ov in December and by the following '..pel ,l?f tfeg
Radicals attempted to discredit Chiang by staging the
I nking affair.
The policy of patl^Rt conciliation which the Powers
1
had adopted toward China changed abruptly. An identic
note of protest was sent to the Nationalists demanding
punishment, apology, and reparation. The Chinese reply was
not favorable. The Nationalists dwelled upon "unequal
treaties" as the real cause of danger to foreigners. They
expressed willingness to make good damages after an impartial
investigation had been made to place the blame where it
belonged.
Some of the Bowers desired Joint military
measures, but at this stage of negotiation, the United States
withdrew $nd the demand for reprisals accordingly dropped.
This action Influenced the course of treaty revision in
favor of diplomacy and peaceful negotiation. Such action
was agreeable to both North and South Qilna. The
1. R. T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations (New York, 1933)
p. 304.
2. Ibid., pp. 308-309.
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Peking Government had concluded treaties with Austria and
Finland concerning commerce and diplomatic exchange.
Another sovereign triumph of the year was made In a treaty
with Belgium whereby China gained the right to terminate
agreements by unilateral action, the Belgian Treaty of
1865 was revised by this process.
On the military front the Nationalists were moving
on toward Shanghai. An expeditionary force of 20,000 British,
American, French, Japanese, Belgian, Italian, Dutch,and
Spanish troops was ready to protect foreign interests.
The need of money for Ms army cause General Chiang K'ai-shek
to ask Chinese bankers In Shanghai for a loan.* Their
reluctance to have any connection with Bolshevism brought
2
forth a refusal to finance Chiang. Finally T. V. Soong,
capable Cantonese banker, convinced Chiang to break relations
with the Communists and ally with the bankers. '/hen the
transaction took place and the selge of 3hanghai lifted, the
British expeditionary force reaped sole credit for the
4
preservation of peace. Chiang had the resources to set up
a new non-Communistic Government at Nanking. The Chinese
Communist Party was forced to submerge but was net wiped out.
It was felt by many of Chiang* s Party that his compromise with
the Po-k rs and the compradore diplomats brought his new
Nanking Government into dependence upon them.
5
1. E. 0. Hausrr, Shanghai , p. 167.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid . , p. 177.
4. Ibid ., p. 181.
5. Ibid. , p. 205.
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The history of China 1 s administration shows a
continuous conflict between the treaty Powers and China
for control of administrative functions.
The first instance of administrative encroachment
by the foreign Powers was the low tariff rate in the
prescribed schedules of the treaties in the First Treaty
Settlement. The inclusion of extraterritorial Jurisdiction
for foreigners In this Settlement and in further extensions
of the right were other violations of Chinese administrative
entity.
Economic exploitation and territorial aggrandize-
ment were at their height after the Chinese-Japanese war.
The fundamental weakness of the Manchu regime made this
foreign aggression possible. Western wealth and organization
also proved too powerful for Republican China to regain the
sovereign rights surrendered by the Empire. The interlocking
forces of foreign diplomacy and business rendered the new
China impotent.
China's great liability in the matter of attaining
satisfactory treaty revision was disunity in the ReDublio
between the worth and South. Civil war merely made the
Powers more anxious to retain their hold on Chinese admin-
istration.
37.
China presented her demands for treaty revision
to the Powers at the Peace Conference in 1919 and they went
unheeded. Again in 1922 at the Washington Confe. once, the
xiationalist alias were presented to the Powers. For Worth
and South united, in one respect, for treaty revision. The
unity China manifested before the world at large at the
Washington Conference is the introductory element in this
study of administrative problems.
The primary purpose of the Washington Conference
was for the consideration oi disarmament, thus lessening
the possibility of war In the Pacific rather than to bringing
relief to China. It was not expected that China would
oouain all sh* ft**lr#d because uhe ^id not a,,vq k ,.; ..rn-
mental organization to defend attacks upon her sovereignty.
Ifef discussion of the Far Eastern Question was supplemental
to the question of devising a method of limiting armament.
Although China asked the Conference to accept ten
points of principles and general policies for procedure
that would Insure her sovereignty, the Powers substituted
the Root Resolutions as blanket policy to be Incorporated
in the Nine Power Treaty concerning China. Mr. Root looked
upon the "resolutions as an expression of present Intentions
and purposes ttl The fourth resolution, initiated by
1. -Conference on the Limitation of Armament' ,
g^ate Document ,
vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sees. (Washington, 1922), p. 457.
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the American delegation was a diplomatic victory for China
that calmed her fears that further encroachments were
1
contemplated against Chinese sovereignty.
(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the
present conditions In order to seek
special right 3 or privileges which would
abridge the rights of the subjects or
citizens of friendly states and from
countenancing action inimical to the
security of such states."
The well publicized Shantung controversy was
settled outside the Conference. The Japanese treaties of
1915 were abro ated, Kiachow was restored, and modifications
were made in Japan»s "vested rights* in Shantung.
A Nine Power Treaty was signed among the United
States, Belgium, Great Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, and Portugal defining principles and
policies to be followed In matters concerning China. This
treaty was the most ambitious attempt by the Powers to help
Chinese rehabilitation. 3 Lack of co-operation in carrying
out these principles and policies was to give the obligation
1. W. W. Willoughby, China at the Conference (Baltimore, 1922),
p. 43.
2. "Conference on the Limitation of Armament", Senate
Documents
, p. 460.
3. A. N. Holoorabe, "Can Nations Co-operate in the Rehabilitate
of China?". American Academy of Political and :?uolal Splence,
CLII (November, 1930 ), ;54M.
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of reform in China to the Chinese themselves.
Signing the Washington treaties did not mean
that the United States had decided to abandon its
2interests in China. Hughes applied a traditional policy
of retreat because he, like Roosevelt, realized that
America would not fight for the preservation of the
territorial or administrative Integrity of China. The
reason was veil known, American commerce and investment
were never overwhelmingly large In China. Thus other
Pow-rs were invited to make our announced policy multi-
lateral. The African Government had an interest at stake
for it had to evaluate the need for protecting business
interest.^ in China or the prestige to be gained from
potential but not actual force. By inviting other Powers
to share the principle of upholding the Open-Door, the
United State 8 seemed to emerge from the conference with
a policy that compromised the issue of upholding Chinese
Integrity and supporting American investment in China.
China made specific demands at the Conference for
administrative autonomy which were not recognized as such
by the Powers. Th© Conference members met the flat request
1. A. N. Holcorabe, "Can Nations Co-op rrate in the
Rehabilitation of China?% American Academy of Political
and -Social Science , OLII (November, 1930 J, 350.
2. A. W. Grlswold, F>r Eastern Policy of the Uni ted r>l;.tes,
p. 321.
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for tariff autonomy evasively by providing for measures
to increase the tariff yield and apply the surtax
promised in 1903. China maintained no hope that extra-
territoriality would be abolished in 1922. However, she
asked that steps be taken toward the eventual relinquish-
ment of the right and she was rewarded with the promise
of a commission to investigate the Judicial systems. The
Conference denied China's right to wireless autonomy by
re-affirming the treaty grant given to foreign powers in
the Boxer Protocol in 1901. Prom the stipulation that the
Powers could keep communications open between Peking and
the sea, wireless stations had been built by foreign
companies in China and supported by foreign governments.
41
CHAPTER II.
TARIFF AUTONOMY
M Immediately or as soon as circumstances will
permit, existing limitations upon China's polltioal,
jurisdictional, and administrative freedom of action are
to be removed. w^
This statement was one of China's ten points of
principle and procedure to be deliberated at the Washington
Conference of 1922.
The first thing that the American delegation did
was to deny the validity of this point. Mr. Root, of the
American delegation, maintained that respect for Chinese
sovereignty required respect for the valid agreements China
2had made. China had made a series of tariff treaties
limiting herself to five percent customs duty. In this
re, ;ard, recognizing China's administrative integrity
involved respect for those limiting treaties. Legality would
not necessarily, however, preclude modification to help
China. Root expressed a desire to see agreement among the
Powers to permit China to increase her customs duties.
In answer, Mr. Koo, Chinese representative,
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Sen te
Documents , vol. X, 6?th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Washington,
1922), p. 444.
2. Ibid., p. 457
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pointed out that the tariff question was dual in character,
political and technical. He hoped consideration of the
problem would follow along these lines. Dr. Koo then asked
for the return to China of the right to tariff autonomy.
China was laboring under the burden of:
(1) a three and a third percent tariff In view of
the prevailing commodity prices,
(2) an infringement of the sovereign right to fix
the tariff rates,
(3) inability to make reciprocity arrangements with
the powers,
(4) no-differentiation of rates between luxuries and
necessities,
(5) a loss of revenue to the Chinese exchequer,
(6) difficulty to bring about revision to an
effective five percent. 1
In asking for tariff autonomy, China professed no
desire to interfere with the present administration of the
Maritime Customs nor to interfere with foreign loans secured
2
to then. Referring to the treaties of 1902 and 1903 as
precedent to raise the Chinese import tariff to twelve and a
half percent, Mr. Root reminded Mr. Koo that those treaties
intended the increase as compensation for the abolition of
likin. Mr. Koo agreed on this point and emphasized the fact
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Senate Documents,
vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sess ( .ashington, 1922), p. 444.
2. Ibid., p. 471
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that China was anxious for the abolition of likin as it
impeded domestic trade as well as foreign.
Senator Underwood, of the American delegation,
read tho report of the subcommittee on tariff. In the
main, the report stated that there were two phases of
tariff re~adjustaent. One of these might become i mediately
applicable without treaty form, related to revision on the
1
basis of an effective five percent tariff. A committee of
revision would meet at Shanghai for this purpose. The
additional revenue it expected to raise for China was set
at approximately £17,000,000 silver. The second phase of
adjustments, which must be in treaty form, required
ratification of subjects to be dealt with in a special
conference. To apply this phase, seeps would be taken for
tho convening of a special conference to abolish likin and
bring the surtaxes of the treaties of 1902 and 1903 into
effect. otb of these measures concerning China* s tariff
were incorporated in a treaty signed by the nine member
Powers relating to revision of the Chinese Customs Iteriff.
An annex or protocol to the Treaty was advanced,
embodying the statement by the Chinese delegation of their
intent on not to change the present administration of the
1. Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Senate documents
vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1922), p. 59U.
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Chinese Efaritlce Customs. ?.!r. Koo objected to making
domestic policy of the Chinese Oovcrnment en in temat! oriel
1
treaty obligation. Senator Underwood, backing Mr. Koo,
spoke for a large number of Americans who, he said, would
protest a treaty coercing China into an agreement that was
unsatisfactory to her, Mr. Koo added that the Chinese
declaration did not mean that China had foresworn her
"legitimate aspiration to make the Chinese .Maritime Customs
2
service an institution more national in China." It was
unanimously agreed that the Chinese voluntary declara tlon
of policy would not be publicly announced in the treaty.
_hls concession was a diplomatic victory for the Chinese.
However, the request for tariff autonomy was not
granted in 1922. The Powers admitted the need for
modification of China's customs tariff and provided for it,
but the "existing limitation on her sovereignty" was not
removed, bollard in his study of the period give special
commendation to the capable Peking diplomats who represented
China at this time. Itieir accomplishments were significant
in the development of treaty revision, thou^i they failed
3
because of lack of support at Peking* The militarists who
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Axaament," i>enate Documents, ,
vol. : , 67 th Con f 2d Seas. (Washington, 1922 } , p. 770.
2. Ibid ., p. 773.
5. R. fa Pollard, China's Forei m relations , (Kew York, 1933),
p. 406,
~~
"
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controlled Peking denied the constructive work of the
diplomats and used the Peking Foreign Office as a buffer
between their Government and the Foreign Powers.
The work of the Revision Commission provided by
the Customs Treaty was completed by September 28, 1922, and
the American State Department was prepared to publish the
revised schedule before the Customs Treaty was actually
ratified. To do so it *as necessary to obtain the separate
approval of each government concerned. The Japanese delayed
concerted action by suggesting a two weeks advance notice of
the revised schedule before It should be put into effect.*
The Powers accepted this olan and thereby delayed the
application of the Import tariff until January 17, 1923.
Once the technical aspect of the tariff problem
had been settled, the political phase emerged as a focus of
international Interest. The United States was anxious to
have the tariff ouestlon discussed as an entity. Hughes
instructed the American Banking Group to formulate a plan
for dealing with China's unsecured debts and thus relieve
the coming Special Conference from the burden of discussing
Chinese finance. For the State Department felt that
1. Foreign Relations, 1922, I, p. 821.
2. Foreign Relations , 1922, I, p. 532.
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unsettled finances could prevent a constructive use of
the proposed customs surtax that was to be implemented at
the 3peclal Conference. Hughes feared that a political
reaction would then take place when the Chinese saif the
misuse of the surtax expenditure. Also, a point to be
considered, some of China *s unsecured debts (notably the
Japanese Nislhara loans) were connected with controversial
political questions. Aheir political character would cause
agitation at the Special Conference and confuse the main
issue. Hughes* analysis proved later to be accurate, but
no action was taken on the matter at this time.
In 1923 the Powers had to determine an Immediate
policy with regard to the distribution of customs surplus
funds to the two Chinese Governments which were claiming
them. 0ur interests in the Customs lay in the pledge
of the Chinese Maritime Customs revenues as security for the
payment of the Boxer indemnity. This connection brought the
Customs under treaty rights in the event that maintenance
was endangered.
The Canton authorities threatened to seize the
Maritime Custoras to secure their share of the surplus. The
Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Canton Government
1. Foreign Relations, 1923, I, p. 536.
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presented the diplomatic body with ••the claim of the
Southwestern provinces for their share of the customs
surplus."
1
His note lodged a complaint aralnst distribution
of the surplus which remained after the payment of foreign
debts. He declared that the surplus paid past debts of the
Peking Government and thus set free other revenues which
were then used by Northern militarists to make war against
the South. Canton promised that it would use its share of
the funds for constructive purposes: municipal improvements;
provincial roads; currency reform; river conservancy;
agriculture and sericulture; education and the suppression
of piracy. The note denied the validity of the Peking
Government and condemned the policy of the United states for
recognizing it as the Government of China.
The issue at hand for the United States was danger
of disintegration of the customs service. Because of the
basis in treaty right, Coolldge gave his approval of the
use of naval units to prevent the proposed seizure. The
State Department, further, believed that the whole system
of treaty rights for the maintenance of foreign trade would
be endangered by the contemplated move of the Canton
Government. The American Minister advocated a course of
1. Foreign Relations , 1923, I, p. 552.
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waiting out the threat of the Canton regime, hoping to
force the Chinese people to unite against internal forces
of disruption. 1 This course reiterated the appeal made by
the American Government to the ^inese before China had
declared war against the Central Powers. The United States
had consistently desired political unity in China. The
Department was adamant in its original stand in the matter of
dealing with the customs surpluses only as trustees for the
recognized government of China.
With its policy outlined, the United States joined
the Powers in a naval demonstration to prevent the proposed
seizure by Canton. The situation was awkward because of the
complications Involved. If the Powers took the Maritime
Customs house, Sun Yat-Sen ' s group might make a counter move
afrd declare Canton a free port, ^hat would force the Powers
to declare a blockade or give up the contest.
The diplomatic body at Peking informed the
Government at Canton that the granting or refusal of their
claim did not lie within the province of the power of the
diplomatic body. The policy was determined by Treaty rights
in 1901 \*hereby the Powers, derive from that protocol
the right to ensure the priority of the payment of interest
l Foreign Relations, 1923, I, p. 555.
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and amortization of certain foreign loans secured on the
customs revenues previous to 1901 and of payment of
interest and amortization of the indemnity. ... 1,1 Further-
more, by agreement between the diplomatic body and the
Chinese Government January 30, 1912, the diplomatic body
was given trusteeship of the Maritime Customs revenues to
protect the Boxer obligations. Strictly defining the sphere
of their power, the diplomats, by concerted action, refused
the request of the Canton Government.
The Nationalist press reported that its Government
would probably start anti-foreign agltr.tion in answer to the
2
naval demonstration. It charged that the Powers were
holding the large customs revenues that were needed by the
Chinese to reduce taxes and the cost of living. The
propaganda attacked the United States and expressed Chinese
disappointment in finding the United States ready to use
force with the other Powers. Sun Yat-Sen issued a manifesto
to the American people complaining of the naval threat to
Canton.
The Nationalists complemented publicity with action.
Sun ordered the commissioner of customs to hold all customs
1. Foreign Relations , 1923, I, p. 568.
2. Loc. Clt.
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revenues at the disposal of the Canton Government, minus
the surplus paid to foreign obligations. 2his willingness
to uphold foreign obligations showed a sincere desire on the
part of the Cantonese Government to win recognition from the
powers as the lawful government of China.
A few days after the Canton manifesto was issued,
half of the British force withdrew from Canton. The American
Minister noted this move as a possibility that Britain was
weakening, and urged that she be persuaded to maintain
collective solidarity on the most important matter that had
come up since the Washington Conference. The British replied
that they no longer considered the naval demonstration
necessary, but desired arrangements for its renewal if the
1
need should ever arise. The United States re-avowed its
intent to co-operate in the event of a similar emergency,
also, but it denied that the demonstration was no longer
necessary. However, shortly after this reply, the American
force was withdrawn in accordance with Hughes' Instructions
that the naval unit could depart if Sun Yat-3en*s group did
not carry out their threat to seize the Customs or attack
the Customs house, and they did not. Although the danger
1. Foreign Relations, 1924, I, p. 409
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of seizure flared again that year, the British Foreign Office
learned that Sun Yat-sen was threatening to seize only the
"native* Canton customs, and for this action there would be
no need for a naval demonstration by the Powers. The Powers
succeeded in preventing the proposed seizure, but the
results were unsatisfactory for the prestige of foreigners
in China. The naval demonstration caused Canton to look to
Ilussla for aid against foreign encroachment.
The Peking Government gained an Immediate advantage
over the United States in the matter of collecting certain
Internal taxes and succeeded in complicating the tariff
situation which the Powers were planning to determine at
the coming Tariff Conference. The Standard Oil Company of
New York asked the State Department for support to secure an
efficient system of taxation in China.
1 The complaint
was made that certain provinces, deprived of likin on foreign
imports, had placed a local tax almost equal to the amount
paid for Customs transit passes and had given passes for
further exemption in exchange. " Such a system defrauded the
Central Government and undermined treaty provisions. The
Department expressed sympathy for the Company but acknowledged
1. Foreign Relations
,
1924, I, p. 481.
2. Ibid.
,
p. 579.
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an inability to take action re llkin because the Treaty of
February 6, 1922 relating to Chinee Cur torn 8 Tnriff hm& not
been ratified by all Powers. This was a local victory whereby
the provinces profited at the expense of the Peking Government.
3uch lack of foresight would not help convince the foreign
Powers of China* s ability to determine her own tariff, much
as It might hasten the special conference.
The Chinese Government proposed a preliminary
conference to decide a tentative agenda for later proceedings.
The necessity for putting the surtax into operation was
apparent to the Chinese in view of the drastic financial
condition and the inability to pay foreign and domestic
obligations. However, In view of chaos in China, the
representatives of the signatory Powers advised examination
of tlie financial status of China and the proposed use of the
2
surtax. They felt, moreover, that the Peking Government
should present its plan for the abolition of likln. These
stipulations were advised before a reply to the Chinese
request was made. The American Minister feared that if
the preliminary conference should fail, the weight of the
3
m.
Special Conference would be considerably decreased. The
I.
2.
3.
Foreign Relations
,
1924, I, p. 514
Ibid., p. 515.
Ibid., 1924, I, p. 515.
53.
Department concurred with the Minister because of the
disregard of trr.aty rights by the provincial official the
discriminatory railroad rates, and other Instances of
endang- ring American nationals and property.
1
The safest
course, then, would be that based on definite treaty
stipulations. The request for a preliminary conference was
accordingly refused.
The Peking Government, on June 24, 1925, sent an
Identic note to the Powers, requesting a readjustment of
trr:,:ty relations. Representatives of the Peking Foreign
Office assured the American Charge that the purpose of the
note was to proceed with the national aspirations cf the
Chinese and to neutralize radical propaganda which aimed at
2
the cancellation of "unequal treaties." Whatever its
purposes, the note brought action from the Povrers.
Representatives of the signatory Pox^ers of the Washington
Conference in China suggested to their governments that the
Special Tariff Conference and the Extraterritoriality
Commission be convened as soon as China could re-estab'ish
order. Thus China took the initiative in forcing the Po -era
1. Foreign Relations ,- 1924, I, pp. 516-517.
2. Foreign Relations 1925, I, p. 765.
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to carry out the promises of the Washington Treaty. The
unknown factor was the extensive meaning behind the
reestablishment of order in China.
Kellogg instructed the American Delegates to the
Tariff Conference J. V. A. MacHurray and Silas Strawn that,
"the Special Conference ought to go beyond the strict scope
of its activities as defined In the Customs Treaty and enter
into a discussion of the entire subject of the conventional
tariff, even including proposals looking toward ultimate
tariff autonomy. Kellogg felt that the levying of a surtax
was mandatory and should not be limited by the condition that
China abolish likln. He deviated from Hughes' suggestion
that the question of Chinese finance best be excluded from
the conference. For the political situation that prevailed
made it advisable that the Conference should consider using
surtax revenues to refund China's unsecured obligations.
In the instructions, his last concern was for the
co-operative policy which he hoped could be maintained, but
not at the risk of our taking sides for or against any other
3
government represented at the Conference. Thus Kellogg 1 s
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 842.
2. Ibid . , p. 845.
3. Ibid., p. 847.
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policy can be Interpreted as sympathetic to the Chinese.
He gave evidence here, of wanting to co-operate with the
Po-ers only on condition that we would not have to enter
an agreement detrimental to Chinese Nationalist aims and
ambiti ons.
In drafting a reply to the Chinese note, Kellogg
•ished to extend the scope of the Special Tariff Conference
to revise the customs treaties "looking toward ultimate
tariff autonomy. The American Minister, MacMurray,
suggested the unadvlsability of using the phrase "tariff
2
autonomy. M To him the entire temper of Chinese national
expression had changed to one desiring repudiation of
foreign obligations. For this osychological factor of
China's feeling of inferiority should not be overlooked by
foreign Powers who had treaty rights in China. The process,
he thought, should be gradual relinquishment, and for this
reason the United States should stay with the Powers in
determining revision policy. Kellogg was firm in his
expression that we were ready to consider the entire matter
of treaty revision with the other Powers or alone. However,
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 797.
2. Ibid., p. 798.
3. Ibid., p. 805.
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he let Kacilurray decide whether or not to include the phra
in the event of our sending a note to China concerning
American policy.
MaoMurray thus had freedom to act on the matter.
His action was a statement of his opinion regarding the
customs tariff.
....My Government sympathizes with the feeling
of the Chinese Government that the tariff
schedules attached to the various treaties between
China and other Powers have become a severe
handicap upon the ability of China to adjust its
import tariffs to meet the domestic economic needs
of the country
, and is furthermore willing
either at that Conference or at a subsequent time
to consider and discuss any reasonable proposal
that may be made by the Chinese Government for a
revision of the Treaties on the subject of the
tariff 1
Thus MaoMurray prevented his Government from stating that it
was ready to take individual action on the question of the
tariff and from recognizing China's right to tariff autonomy.
The co-operative policy was maintained, and the civil strife
in China was allowed to run its course without interference
from foreign Powers.
As time for the Conference to meet drew near,
Kellogg felt unprepared to aay whether or not it would be
wise for us to declare for unconditional surrender of tariffs
1. Fux-eign Relations , 1925, I, p. 833.
5?
and extraterritoriality. The possibility arose that we might
be driven to such independent release if the other Powers
refused to make reasonable concessions. 1 The Secretary of
State was apparently keenly responsive to public opinion.
A conference was held in Baltimore September 26, 1925 to
discuss American Relations with China. A resolution was
adopted to bring about independent action on the part of
the United States concerning treaty revision.
The Chinese Minister presented a provisional
agenda to the Powers. Tariff autonomy and an interim surtax
were the main topics for discussion, according to the Chinese
desires. From its secondary position on the agenda, the
abolition of llkin was considered relatively unimportant.
The representatives of the Conference Powers sent an identic
telegram to their governments, recommending the modification
of the Chinese proposals to emphasize the abolition of llkin
as a major consideration. The purpose of the modification
was to make tariff autonomy a mere wish on the part of the
Chinese Government and thus to separate llkin from tariff
autonomy. 3
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 850.
2. H. K. Norton, "Washington and Peking", Asia , XXVI
(August 192G), p. 716.
3. Foreign Relations, 1925, I, p. 853.
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Kellogg, while preferring action without an
agenda of any sort, nevertheless felt that it should be
accepted to show the Powers 1 desire to co-operate rather
than to dictate to the Chinese. 1 Here again, the Secretary
was voicing his belief that China was entitled to such
consideration among the Powers. Accordingly, he proposed
a new tariff as a solution of the problem, which would
embody a general tariff of raost-fwored-nation treatment
for an Interim period preparatory to the oomolete restoration
of tariff autonomy.
Again HaoMurray advised the 3ecretary of mate
2
that China did not expect tariff autonomy. The core of the
problem, rather, was the possibility of getting the Pour re
five
to agree to an interim surtax of / percent instead of the
two and a half percent as provided in the treaty. It would
be used as basis for a loan, the greater part of which would
be given to funding the unsecured foreign and domestic debts ,
4
and the balance would be used for administrative function*.
Xm Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 855.
Z. Ibid . , p. 857.
3« Loc. clt .
4. Loo, clt.
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At the opening session of the Special Conference,
the Chinese delegates laid strong emphasis on the importance
of tariff autonomy for China 1 a economic equality in the
1
world. The Chinese Government proposed tariff autonomy
and abolition of likln as simultaneous measures to come Into
2
effect January 1, 1929. In this proposal, provision was
made for an Interim surtax on luxuries.
Answering replies characterized the Powers
convictions regarding the tariff. The American Minister
spoke for proceedings that would help the Chinese national
aspirations to become realized. He did not mention
tariff autonomy, per se> although the national expression
for it was well publicized. The French emphasized the
4
necessity for financial rehabilitation of China. The
British evidenced a desire to remain within the scope
g
outlined at Washington in 1922. '-The Japanese gave outright
support to the consideration of tariff autonomy. However, the
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 861.
2. Ibid., p. 862.
3. Ibid., p. 863.
4. Loo, olt .
5. Loo, cit .
6. Ibid., p. 865.
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sweeping statement of the Japanese Minister was qualified
by his admitting that tariff autonomy was a goal to be
reached only by successive stages."*"
At a tariff autonomy committee meeting, China
asked the Powers to concede the principle of autonomy with
the abolition of likin. The United States reserved decision
until further study of the plan to abolish likin and other
taxes had been made. Dr. Wang answered for China by saying
that the delay in abolishing likin was caused by the fact
that likin was the main source of revenue for many of the
2provinces. He suggested an investigation of the problems
in the provinces to facilitate abolition. Compensation for
likin would be necessary and could be paid by the Central
Government from a portion of the increased customs revenue
of the surtax.
Kellogg approved of the suggestion of the American
delegation that, "The Chinese Government is so lacking in
stability that there is great danger that this or a succeed-
ing government may renounce the treaties unless we concede
some of the demands. tt For this reason it was decided to
accept the Chinese proposal for the abolition of likin.
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 865.
2. Ibid . , p. 873.
3. Ibid., p. 871.
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However, an Impasse was reached on the question of
tariff autonomy. The Chinese delegation wanted the Conference
to "declare recognition of China's right to enjoy tariff
autonomy" upon the abolition of likln. 1 The Powers wanted
China to accept their M intention to recommend to their
respective Governments the Immediate adoption of a treaty
which shall recognize China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy."
The subcommittee on tariff autonomy recommended a resolution
that was unanimously adopted by the Conference recognizing
China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy and acknowledging
her promise to abolish llkln.
This resolution was exactly what China wanted. The
next step would be to have it accepted by the Governments of
the delegates. The Chinese got the impression from the
ensuing diplomacy that the Powers admitted China's right to
tariff autonomy but withheld legal recognition. The
Conference, it would seem, adopted the resolution as an
expedient measure In the face of adverse propaganda urging
the establishment of tariff autonomy, preferably through
1. For. IgB gel .ion:., 1925, I, p, 879.
2. Loc. . clt .
3. S. K. Hornbeck.
C
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diplomacy, but, if necessary, by abrogating all customs
treaties.
The Powers, however, held a. superior position.
The political and financial state of China was chaotic,
-hen the Special Conference went into session early in 1926,
the Powers were seriously concerned with the insecure position
of the Central Government
. Th^t Government was asking for
the two and one half percent surtax to become effective
immediately and for unrestricted use of the revenue.^" The
American delegation opposed the political connotation of
foreign support that might be granted to this Government.
For Militarists were in control of Peking and they would
probably use the increased revenue to wage war against the
South. The South 1 s objection to Peking control of the
surtax was the same as its argument against the distribution
of the customs surplus in 1923. Both Governments however
were in drastic need of financial assistance.
The Americans proposed to carry on negotiations
irrespective of disturbed conditions. Ty>e Chinese requested
continuation of the conference, and the United StateB was
willing to comply to please China and to live up to our
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, p. 743
declared policy at Washington.
To abide by the terras of the Washington Conference,
the American delegation wanted the Powers to co-operate on a
general tariff policy. Therefore, if China should dis-
integrate before the tr< aty was ratified, it would not be the
fault of the Powers. Kellogg informed the British Government
of our desire to continue negotiations, and expressed hope
that the British would co-operate with the Conference to
keep it in session. 1
The American, British, and Japanese advisers drew
up a draft protocol agreeing:
(1) to levy surtaxes,
(2) to collect them in Maritime Customs Administration
and apply them to
:
(a) abolition of likin,
(b) abolition of "coast traue duty",
(o) administrative need of gov. rnuient
,
(d) liquidation of unsecured debts,
2
(e) deposit in specified banks.
The governments of the representatives with the exception of
Japan approved the protocol. The Japanese delegation
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, p. 749.
2. Ibid. , pp. 750-751.
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maintained the desire of Its government not to "implement
' the Washington surtaxes apart from the negotiation of the
larger treaty which the Conference had under consideration, H
which included funding the unsecured debts. 1 They claimed
willingness for a summer recess and readjournraent
September 30. MacMurray objected to the recess on the grounds
2
that it violated the pledge given by the Powers to China,
but It went through.
While the Conference was adjourned, the Nationalist
Government at Canton protested against resuming the Conference,
on the grounds that it supported the militarists. The American
Minister replied to Chen, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
at Canton, that lack of unanimity in China denied the attempt
2
of the Po-.rers to give effect to treaty readjustment. The
communication was sent in the hope that It might serve a
useful purpose if Chen did not accept it as material for
propaganda. Chen immediately outlined the Nationalist
opinions to MacMurray:
The policy (of the United States) is wrong
because it is an expression of American failure to
realize that the Chinese situation is fundamentally
a Revolutionary situation i.e. a fundamental
,
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solution is necessary as opposed to a solution
Involving a aeries of so called Revolutionary
re-adjustments. And the situation is Revolutionary
because the principle of change implicit in the
Revolution of 1911-12 has not yet been vorked out
in the life of the Nation, particularly in its
politico-economic aspect, owing to the constant
interference and Intervention, direct and indirect,
of certain Foreign Powers who (to cite some single
Instances) first supported Yuan Shih-kal in his
attempt to destroy the Chinese Republic and
financed him with the Re-orranization loan of 1913,
next supported Tuan Chi- Jul in his Anfu days (pro-
Japanese) and financed him with the Nishiara and
other loans, then supported Wu Pei-fu and financed
him with Customs and Salt surpluses, and are now
contemplating the support of a composite strong
man in the diversified persons of Wu Pel-fu and
Chang Tso-lin ond the financing of this brace of
militarists with the proceeas of a loan to be
secured on the promised Tariff surtaxes.
Nationalist China insists on a fundamental
solution of the group of Issues known as the Chinese
question. Internally, this means that the new
military and political technique which has enabled
the Nationalist £ov eminent to unify the Liang-Kuang
militarily, fiscally and politically must be applied
on a national scale in order that the Chinese people
may work out their own salvation in the interests of
themselves as a whole and not to subordinate the
same to such alien interests as foreign high finance
and foreign trade. And externally, the dominating
feature of a fundamental solution of the Chinese
question is that America should revise its present
policy of "bringing into effect certain re-adjust-
ments' of its treaty relations with China" and,
recognizing the neces ity of a General Re-adjustment
of such treaty relations, instead of re-adjustments
on the Instalment plan, satisfy the demand of
Nationalist China for the substitution of the
uneaual treaties by other treaties consistent with
the real independence and sovereignty of China.
This is a policy that has been definitely brought
within the range of practical politics and proved
to be both practicable and expedient by the bold
statesmanship of Soviet Russia.
66.
As there is not such a government at the
moment, I have the honour to repeat the warning
that the Nationalist Government whose authority
is now extending to Central China, will repudiate
all and every loan to be concluded with agents of
Wu Pel-fu and Ohang Tso-lln in Peking, and to add
that the resumption of the Special Conference
x/ill be viewed by my Government as a deliberate
attempt on the part of the United States an, other
Inter*- sted Powers to convert the Chinese Maritime
Customs from a politico-fiscal organ into an
engine of war-finance and foreign intervention in
China 1 s civil or other Revolutionary war. In
this event the Nationalist Government will be
compelled to take certain defensive measures.*
The Peking Government was trying to force the
Powers to reconvene the Conference by threatening to assume
tariff autonomy. >*ith both North and 3outh threatening the
PowersjHACilurray had acted independently and began negotiations
with the Canton regime. He then explained his purpose to
Kellogg who sanctioned it.
I regret that, under the necessity of taking
Immediate action to avert our being placed in false
light of partisanship toward the military coalition
now occupying capital, I was compelled to take a
position in this delicate matter without the
opportunity of obtaining your instructions; and my
having done so may indeed result in diminishing
chances that this Cabinet might obtain recognition
either of our own or of other governments; and it
must be realized that there is at present tine no
reasonable prospect nor any expectation among
representative China of the formation in the
immediately forseeable future of a government 2
commanding the general support of the country
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, pp. 851-853.
2. Ibid.
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The Amirioan State Department had no de-ire to
break with the Powers on the question of continuing the
Conference. The best course to pursue in accordance irith
the Washington Treaty would be action by the Powers to
enforce surtaxes on their own nationals independent of China.
1
The 3ritish Indicated willingness to follow along these lines
p
without consideration of likin or debt consolidation.
C. P. Howl and in his study of the diplomacy of this
period found a general parallel between the British and
American policies on the matter of co-operating for the
benefit of China. However, he found that the United States
was always Just a little behind Great Britain in its liberality
toward Chinese national aspiration. He described the British
attitude as a natural aspect of their position in China which
was the initiator of the treaty system, leading trader hurt
by Chinese boycotts, and Power most closely associated with
4
the Shanghai massacre.
1. Foreign Eel at ions , 1926, I, p. 859.
2. Ibid . , p. 863.
3. CP. Kowland, Survey of American Foreign Re atlcj s>
(New Haven, 1930), p. 155.
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During the fall the Powers agreed that there
were no dele??; tes qualified to represent China at the
Conference and consequently the Special Conference was no
longer to be regarded as in session. R. T. Pollard
concluded that the Conference failed partly because the
Peking Government was ineffective as a central organ for
exchange between China and the Powers and partly because
of disagreement among the Powers over disposition of the
1
surtax.
When the Conference failed, the Powers had to meet
the situation of China's imposing taxes that were contrary
to treaty provisions. The Canton Government informed the
Powers that it intended to levy consumption and production
taxes on all merchandise passing through the Maritime Customs
of the port. The proceeds of the revenue were to be used to
pay strikers in the anti-British boycott. The Department
saw no need for discussing the matter of imposition with the
British or Japanese or for planning for a naval demonstration.
The first step was to inform the authorities at Canton of
our concern for the violation of existing treaties, following
procedure of past protests.
1. R. T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations , p. 280,
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The diplomatic body locked upon the imposition
of the Canton taxes as the beginning of the end of treaty-
rights in China. It drew up a draft protest to which the
United States gave adherence. This policy of local protest
was applied by the American Consuls at Tsingtan and Tsinan
against a "goods tax of 2 percent ad valorem imported into
Shantung Province. " Chen informed the Consul at Canton that
his Government wished to follow closely the Tariff Conference
schedules of new taxes. He asked for a list of luxuries
and for the minutes of the Conference meetings, but the
Minister denied his request, awaiting determination of
Department policy. The United States would not conciliate
C nton on minor matt rs befo. e a tariff treaty had been
concluded.
In October the British Minister in conversation
with American Charge Mayer let it be known that his Government
would acquiesce to the new taxation if it ivere placed under
2
the Maritime Customs Administration. The British desired,
hovrever, an exchange of views with the American and Japanese
Departments before taking action. The American State
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, p. 661.
2. Ibid., p. 888.
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Department held to its original stand that taxes violating
treaty rights should be protested, '^ho collecting agent
I.e. Chinese Customs or opposing factions of the Nationalist
Government was to have no Influence on our attitude.
The American Minister warned his Government of the
importance of time In determining our policy. He received
aut orlzation on December 13 to negotiate with Britain and
Japan, H to doolare that the Washington surtaxes would be
applicable to their nationals on condition that the Maritime
Customs collect the taxes and the revenues go to the
1
authorities In control. The United States had a dual policy,
co-operating with the Powers and having Intercourse with the
Nationalist regime. Kellogg supported the co-operative
policy concerning application of the surtax In spite of his
doubting the wisdom of It. America stayed with the Powers
in formulating a tariff policy to the limit of Its oonvlotlon,
although its sympathies were with the moderate nationalists
by the end of 1926.
The British Charge announced to the Chiefs of
Missions in China on December 18 that the British Government
wanted the Powers to grant the Washington surtaxes immediately
1. Foreign Relations , . 1926, I, p. 912.
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and recognize China's "right to enjoy tariff autonomy as
soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national
tariff, .... and while calling upon China to maintain that
respect for the sanctity of treaties which is the primary
obligation common to all civilized states, .... recognize
both the essential justice of China's claim for treaty
revision and the difficulty in present conditions of
negotiating new treaties in the place of old, .... modify
their traditional attitude of a rigid insistence on the
„1
strict letter of treaty rights."
The public concluded from this statement that
Great Brit.iin was talcing a more liberal lead toward China
than the other Powers. MaoMurray criticized the British
p
attitude as conciliatory. It merely invited complete
repudiation of all obligations. However, these radical
concessions by Gr^at Britain, leading trader in China, would
perforce comiiit the United States to an equally liberal
policy to maintain co-operation among Powers.
Accordingly, the State Department fcave full support
to the British statement. Kellogg desired a reciprocal
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, p. 918.
2. Ibid., p. 920.
most-favored-nation treatment with China as soon as treaty
controls were relinquished, ^he Secretary of State announced
his intention of being willing to negotiate revision with
China to abolish extraterritoriality and tariff control in
the near future. The British promise had acted as stimulus
for American action, individual action. Early in January,
1927, Kellogg clarified his policy by professing hope that
the United States would be a moral influence for a united
China. And he asserted that if unity could come about, we
would then be willing to make concessions to China on the
Washington Conf £ renoe Treaties.
1
This statement left the
decision of introducing negotiations up to both of the
Chinese Goveminent s.
Dr. Koo, of the new Peking Cabinet, presented
three demands to the Powers: tariff law autonomy to be
effective January 1, 1929; application of Washington surtaxes
to be levied February 1, through the Maritime Customs and
resumption of the Special Conference; and new revenues
applied to a sinking fund for abolition of likln and for the
2
funding of the unsecured debt for administrative purposes.
American policy of moral leadership was difficult
to maintain, for both the North and South had broken away
1, Foreign Relations , 1926, I, p. 937.
2. Ibid., 1927, II, pp. 372-373.
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from "old treaties" as well as from the Washington Confcrenoe
Treaty. Kwangtung established a provincial tax in addition
to import duties, surtaxes and likin; Kukden declared the
system of exemption certificates inapplicable, for the whole
of liancjiuria and Shantung had its "good tax.* Protests
seemed futile, but the Department instructed the Consulates
to be alert for discriminatory treatment of American citizens
by de facto officials. 1
The Nationalist Government imposed a stamp tax
which the American Government upheld because it was not
discriminatory, for it wa3 levied against Chinese as well as
foreigners. Nor did the Department support the complaint
by wine and tobacco merchants against the tax imposed on
these articles. The Government refused to observe that
arrangements made between the Chinese administration and
private American companies were a basis for protest against
national tax policies. The State Department was Judiciously
and Impartially trying to extend the promises made to China
in 1922. In regard to a luxury tax, In some ports, the
Department acquiesced tacitly in the belief that it was a
collection equivalent of the Washington surtaxes.
The Nationalist Government announced three laws to
1. Foreign Relations , 1927, II, p. 383.
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become effective on September 1st.
:
(a) the law on abolition of internal transit dues,
(b) provisional law on national import tariff,
(c) Law on excise duty.^"
As with the Peking arbitratory action, the American Govern-
ment withheld reply to the demands, considering them a
contravention of treaty rights. Apparently both Peking and
Canton were using the eame arbitrary methods to see if the
Powers would accede. The United States refused. Her offer
treaty
of moral leadership did not countenance/ abrogation. The
Hanking Government decided, w ln view of existing circumstances,
to temporarily postpone the enforcement of *the three
2
proposed laws 1 ." Boi1 Peking and Nankin;- stopped short of
drastic measures that would sever diplomatic connections
completely.
A resolution was introduced to the House of
Representatives on January 4, 1927, requesting that the
President undertake negotiations with China to render the
3
treaty relations between the nations equal and reciprocal.
1. Foreign Relations , 1927, II, p. 400.
2. Ibid . , p. 407.
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In the main, the resolution paralled the policy that the
State Department had been ardously following.
Representatives from the Nationalist Government
called at Washington to discuss the possibility of
negotiating in regard to treaty revision on the basis of
2
Kellogg 1 s statement of January 27. The Nationalist rep-
resentatives expressed a strong desire on the part of their
government to have the support of the United States in T iex*
of the impending break with Soviet Russia. The Poking
and Hanking factions were willing to appoint a Joint
Commission to discuss treaty revision with the United States.
Kellogg expressed willingness to act with them in the hope
that our participating would lead to a union between the
North and South and thus end the Olvil liar. Such action
was similar to our hopes that Washington Conference policies
would help China unite. Actually unification was taking
place through force and this proposal of Kellogg 1 s was
superfluous. Here again, he was combining the two problems
of tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality. HaoMurray
1. Congressional Record , LXVIII, pt. 4, p. 4386.
2. Foreign Relations , 1927, II, p. 366.
3. Ibid., p. 367.
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demurred for such a course was contrary to the policy he had
begun, which contemplated negotiations with the several
regimes in China, solely on the question of tariff
restrictions. Tariff autonomy was to be the immediate
compensation for the establishment of a representative
government.
The Nationalist forces took Peking in June 1928
and united China under the government at Nanking.* The 'nited
States was the first foreign nation to give de jure recognition
to the Nanking Government. MacMurray's policy was immediately
carried out. A treaty regulating tariff regulations between
the United States and China was signed at Peiping July 25.
The use of the name Peiping was the first treaty recognition
of the Nationalist name for Peking.
The question of tariff autonomy lay primarily in
the political sphere of the tariff problem, She heritage of
treaty stipulation and international co-operation had been
too firmly Implanted as Far Eastern Policy for the United
States to give adherence to the Chinese demand for autonomy
in 1922. The proposed 3pecial Conference decided upon at
Washington was merely a component part of declared policy in
1. C. Dennis, "The Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations
een the United States and China." American Journal of
International Law, XXII (October 1928), 834.
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1903 to implement surtaxes granted as compensation for the
abolition of likin.
The turning point of the American policy was
brought by the matter of applying these surtaxes. In
November 1926 the United States was willing to comply v.ith
the other Powers to have the surtaxes imposed and collected
by the Maritime Customs Administration. That Deoember, the
British published the note that suggested appeasement to
Peking and individual action, ^hls action gave the United
States the freedom to uepart on it 6 own policy declared by
Kellogg early in 1927. This was definite departure from
co-operation with the Powers, and it was followed by a
period of awaiting developments between the Chinese Governments.
As the Canton Minister, Chen, had said to Maciiurray,
our policy has been evolutionary in the face of a revolutionary
situation.
1
In 1925 the Canton Government had threatened to
seize the Customs to derive its share of the surplus. It is
interesting to note that the Powers answered this threat
with a naval demonstration that proved effective. By 1926
the co-operative policy had been weakened to the extent that
both Chinese Governments imposed taxes contravenous to treaty
1. /ide note 1, p. 22
rights, and the Powers were forced to accede because they
would not unite for forceful prevention.
Every year that the Tariff Conference Mai delayed,
the Powers lost strength as a co-operative force against
national expression In China. Such weakness caused Peking
to ask for a Preliminary Conference in 1924 to apply the sur-
tax and thus relieve the financial situation. 2his request
• s refused, but the refusal was nt>t powerful enough to
defeat the main purpose of the Chinese. For when China
suggested treaty revision in her note of June 1925, the
Powers felt the need for hastening the Tariff Conference and
the Extraterritoriality Commission.
The United States realized that the scope of the
Customs Treaty of 1922 was inadeouate in 1925. Kellogg gave
evidence of our willingness to grant tariff autonomy as
soon as possible. The Secretary of State and the American
public were anxious to recognize Nationalist China and
conclude a most-favored-nation treaty of equality and
reciprocity with her.
After Kellogg^ statement of moral leadership to a
stable representative government of China, the United States
had to pursue a Judicious policy. The refusal of the
United States to acknowledge Chang Tso-lln»s (Peking) tariff
demand o in 1927 can be interpreted as an indication of our
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pro-Nationalist sentiment. However, the United States
brought equal pressure of disapproval against similar
tactics by the Canton Government that same year.
MaoMurray was responsible for preventing Kellogg
from trying to bring about rapproachement between the North
and 3outh over general treaty revision. This action was the
first immediate step toward diplomatic victory for the
moderate Nationalists. The United States had one highly
desired bargaining measure, the grant of tariff autonomy.
Skillful diplomacy used it to the best advantage.
3C.
CHAPTER III.
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
At the Sixth Meeting of the Committee on Pacific
and Far Eastern Questions at the Washington Conference,
Dr. Wang of the Chinese delegation presented his country's
views on extraterritoriality. 1 There were now fifty ports
In which foreign nationals possessed the right of extra-
2territoriality, where the original number had been five.
This meant a great Increase in the number of people residing
in China over whom China had no control. The matter was
an, "impairment of the territorial and administrative
integrity of China, w and an immediate solution was
imperative. In addition to the national humiliation that
she suffered, China had to acknowledge a multiple system of
courts and the attendant confusion arising thereby.
Consular courts were often too far from the seene wherein
the case originated to make disposal of Justice effective.
Foreigners frequently claimed immunity from local taxes
under extraterritorial exemption. These were some of the
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Senate
Document , vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Washington,
1922), p. 475.
2. Loo, cit .
3. Loc. clt.
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chief objections China had against the extraterritorial
system.. China did not desire complete abolition but a3ked
the powers to co-operate in taking measures toward
eventual abolition based on the promise made by Great
Britain, the United States, and Japan in 1902 and 19G3.1
Accordingly draft resolutions were presented
to the Conference concerning the problem of extra-
territoriality and providing for a commission of the Tine
Powers represented to investigate the practise of extra-
ter ltoriality and Chinese Jurisdiction within three
o
months after adjournment.
Two months after the Washington Conference the
Chinese Government asked for a postponement of the proposed
meeting. They wanted time to assemble necessary technical
Information to facilitate commission proceedings when it
did meet. The United States heartily supported this
request and it was accordingly granted.
The United 3tate3 was willing to fulfill the
terms of the Washington Treaty at the earliest possible
moment. Hughest instruoted his Minister in China to discuss
the proposed commission with his colleagues. He then
1. "Conference on the limitation of Armament,* Sen 'to
Document , vol. X, 67th Con^. , 2d. 3ess. (Washington f
1653), p. 477.
2. Ibid., p. 514.
82.
suggested lines of general investigation of the many legal
compli cations that caused friction between treaty pow rs
and China.
1. All foreign courts, laws and procedure existing
by virtue of treaty provision or custom.
2. All Chinese Courts hearing mixed cases, including the
special courts such as the international Mixed Courts
at Shanghai and Amoy.
3. Chinese law and legal procedure.
4. China's Judiciary.
5. The extent to which China has actually respected
treaty stipulations relative to extraterritoriality.
6. China's present political condition in its bearing
on the legal and judicial systems, with particular
reference to the possibility of interference with
the course of Justice by civil or military
authorities.
7. The status of non-treaty power nationals such as
Russians, G-erraans, and Austrians.
8. The status of persons of Chinese race who acquire
foreign nationality and remain or return to
Chinese soil.
9. Extradition and the right of asylum in the 1
Settlement, Concession, and Legation areas.
Hughes position supported the general contention
of other Pow- rs holding extraterritorial privileges in China who
were not encouraged to relinquish them when they witnessed
1. Foreign Relations , 1923, I, p. 620.
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the dis satisfaction among nationals of Powers who had
withdrawn the grant. The merchants and business men of
Austria and Germany had soon found protection from Chinese
Jurisdiction by incorporating their interest with American
or British firms. Soviet Russia had withdrawn extra-
territoriality in China in 1919 with other cancellations
of special privileges to foster good will toward Communism
in China. There were two or three thousand Russians in
China thereby placed in the position of non-treaty power
foreigners without extraterritorial rights."*" The results
were not satisfactory. Confusion and legal misunderstandings
arose to such an extent that treaty Powers would not be
Inclined to think of relinquishing their rights.
Prom the example of these non-treaty Powers, it
would seem that the other Powers were not selfishly denying
China a sovereign right. The danger to foreigners during
the turbulent period after the Va? was active enough to
cause their Governments to unanimously agree to maintain
the extraterritorial privileges.
The Chinese Government announced readiness to
have the Commission meet November 1, 1923. The representatives
of the signatory Powers in Peking with the exception of the
1. H. B. Morse and H. P. HacNair, Far pastern International
Relations (Cambridge, 1931), p. 672.
United 3tates were against convening the commission in the
light of existing conditions. For during this year
foreigners in China were x*orried about the resumption of
war in Northern China. In time of Civil War treaty nationals
felt the Importance of their extraterritorial protection
more than ever before. However, it has been suggested that
the foreigners wished protection more against the hostile
attitude of the Chinese than against the Chinese laws
1
themselves.
Hughes agreed with the seriousness of the situation
but expressed the hope that an early meeting of the Com mission
would emphasize the political abuse in China and thus foroe
the Chinese to correct it as the first step in ridding
themselves of the obnoxious treaty privileges.
....from the vieivpolnt that this Government
is concerned not to chan don the Chinese claim
to immediate relief from the burden of extra-
territoriality, but to pursue the course which
will best tend to bring about conditions of
order and stability and enable China to fulfill
the obligations as well as "to claim Jha pre-
rogatives of a sovereign state 8
1. H. S. Qwlgley, "Extraterritoriality in China", An rlcan
Journal of International Law, XX (January, 1926), p. 67.
2 . Foreign Relations , 1923, I, p. 622.
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The legal life of the Peking Government had died
by September 1923 because Parliament had neglected to elect
a President as stipulated in the Permanent Constitution. 1
The American Kinister then advised Hughes to accept
postponement of the proposed commission. The Secretary of
State agreed, for he re^aized that unanimous approval of
the Powers would be necessary for the success of the
Commission and the present conditions in China would not
encourage the Powers to give their consent. He advanced
a proposal, however, accepted by the majority that a time
limit should be put upon the postponement, November 1, 1924.
It was impossible to gain unanimity on this point either
and Hughes then warned the American Minister in China to
inform the Chinese Foreign Office of the failure, but not
to give, "any Intimation as to the attitude taken by the
individual Powers concerned toward the meeting of the
Commission. " 3uch action was diplomatic insurance for the
co-operative policy. Hughes 1 policy had been succinctly
declared but thus far without success.
Repeatedly throughout 1924 the Department of
State endeavored to persuade France to break the deadlock
1. Foreign Relations , 1923, I, p. 622.
2. Ibid,, pp. 630-631.
Vof international opposition to China by concluding a
settlement in regard to the payment in gold of the French
share of the Boxer indemnity. 1 Hughes was firmly convinced
that pressure by the Powers on the Chinese Government would
not restore satisfaction to either side. Therefore, it
was the French obligation to settle the affair. The "gold
franc 11 dispute was the most serious controversy after the
'Washington Conference. America, Great Britain, and Japan
had little interest in the case because they were not
affected financially, but they maintained a "solid front"
in co-operation against China by not forcing France to
3
settle the affair.
The delay In ratifying the Washington Trerty
prevented definite action from being taken re extra-
territoriality during the years 1922-1925. The Chinese
were becoming increasingly anti-foreign, staging labor and
student demonstrations against imperialistic capitalism.
Propaganda against the Peking regime was successful because
it was not suppressed. The weak Peking Government, however,
managed to settle the gold franc dispute with France in
1. Foreign Relations , 1924, I, pp. 425-426.
2. H. H. Gowen and J. W. Hall, An Outline History of China,
(New York, 1927), p. 451.
3. Loc. cit.
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1925 and thus the Washington Treaty went into effect. In
the faoe of domestic turmoil and international pressure
Peking also managed to send a note to the Powers June 24,
1925, demanding treaty revision. Repercussions were
immediate and indicative of a coming change in Chinese
relations with the Povers.
Concerning extraterritoriality, Kellogg wanted
to reply that the United States was willing to send
commissioners to investigate the problem with a view
toward relinquishing the privileges as soon as possible.
China looked to the United States to hasten the Powers
into agreement on the proposed commission. Apparently the
Chinese were not as determined about extraterritoriality
as they were about tariff autonomy, for the Peking Minister
stated that his government did not expect the Sxtra-
territorial Commission to do more than make a report that
would not constitute a binding promise of release to China
from the Powers. Tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality
were part of the more comprehensive aspect of foreign control
2
in China. Events were taking place, however, that would
convince the Powers of the necessity for specific action
regarding the administrative problems of treaty revision.
1. H. H. Gowen and J. W. Hall, An Outline History of China ,
p. 447.
2. Ibid., p. 773.
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After the labor troubles assoolated with the
Shanghai incident, Japan made every effort to bring co-
operation among the British, American, and Japanese to
settle the affair and other aspects concerning China.
Japan favored granting the Nationalist aims for tre- ty
revision to enable China to build a stable government.
The Japanese position In Manchuria was believed to be
vital to her existence as a nation. In regard to these
last two beliefs the Japanese diplomacy was contradictory.
Japan wanted a sovereign China except where Japan established
her own interests. The American State Department inter-
preted the Japanese overture for co-operation as either a
decision to remain with the Western Powers or as fear that
the United States would assume the lead in granting
concessions to China and thereby threaten Japanese influence
in Peking.*
The British were inclined to favor holding the
Tariff Conference because they felt its scope would of
necessity be broadened to include the question of extra-
territlriallty, whereas simultaneous meetings would
o
probably confuse the Chinese."' The British, for the most
part, were in general agreement with the United States
1. Foreign Relations, 1925, I, p. 769.
2. laid.
,
p. 774.
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concerning treaty revision. They would not, however,
define the work of the Extraterritoriality Commission as
finely as did the United States.
President Goolidge Instructed the State Depart-
ment to judge the matter of an Extraterritoriality Commission
carefully, but to co-operate with the Powers as far as
possible to prevent the Chinese from seeing a division in
accord.
1
This was confirmation of Hughes' policy.
Kellogg informed Britain and Japan that he believed
that only rigid adherence to the Washington Conference
obligations woula solve the problem of "growing national
2
unrest in China." The Department was inclined to believe
that China's internal chaos was only a partial answer to
the postponement and delay of the Extraterritoriality
'Joi imission. Its erroneous supposition was that conditions
in China in 1925 merely differed in degree from those in
1922. For this reason, the Washington Conference
commitments would be suitable. Kellogg felt that the
replies of the Powers should be sent to the Chinese
Government as soon as possible and should form the basis of
3
a statement for publication.
1. Foreign Relations , 19ES< I, p. 778.
2. Ibid . , p. 780.
3. Ibid., p. 783.
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MaoMurray then began to warn the Department about
the attendant danger of too close co-operation trith Japan
and Great Britain. Hp ten-red that the empha«is Jppnn
placed upon the dlf ferentlation between Hanchuria and China
proper was a forerunner of an understanding parallel to
the Lansing-Ishii agreement or the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 1
Our position was thereby made especially delicate because
China was awaiting our reaction to her anti-British and
anti-Japanese labor demonstrations.
The United States expressed itself in agreement
with Great Britain that the reply of the diplomatic body
at Peking, "should embody an emphatic statement that there
can be no discussion of p rtioular reforms, much less a
review by the Powers of their treaty relations with China
until the Chinese Government have given evidence of their
ability and willingness to suppress disorders and to enforce
respect for the safety of foreign lives and property and
put an end to strikes and agitations which are harmful to
2
Chinese and foreign commercial interests...." Although as
a matter of practical policy, the United States did not
believe that the complete restoration of order should be
required for discussing treaty relations. In the course of
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 787.
2. Ibid . , p. 793.
3. Loc. clt.
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events, the practical policy was to become dominant.
MaoMurray analyzed conditions in China relating
to the present situation. The movement seemed to him to
be national, motivated from within rather than from Russian
incitement. 1 His separating pure Nationalism from the
prevailing Communistic influence pointed the way to the
later American policy of supporting the moderate Nationalists.
He informed Kellogg that the Chinese radicals were opposed
to taking part in the Special Conference or the Extra-
territoriality Commission because such measures -,/ere
further recognition of the rlr;ht of foreign Powers to
dictate to China. The less radical trend of thought
represented at Peking maintained that the desire for treaty
revision was largely a political catchphrase. The Peking
Government suggested a new conference to consider the
question of treaty revision more to gain prestige for their
regime than to urge the Po ers to make concessions to China.
^
The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Peking stated that there
were many Chinese reluctant to chance a loss of foreign
trade and to experience probable administrative chaos that
might result when tariff autonomy was granted and extra-
territoriality was abolished. The increasing strength of
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 799.
2. Ibid.
, p. 801.
the "Right 8 Recovery Movement" left the Minister*
s
statement open to question.
The Powers sent an identic reply to the Chinese
requests warily providing for the convention of the
Extraterritorial Commission. No binding oomnitment was
made in this note because of the generality in the wording,
"what, if any, steps...."
....The Establishment of the courts and the
enactment of laws, however, do not in
themselves meet all the requirements of the
situation. Courts cannot function and
develop properly or consistently without the
aid of a stnble Government. .. .and the most
feasible way in which the question can be
approached and considered is to send to
China the Commission provided for in Resolution
V of the Washington Conference, . . . .what, if any,
steps may be taken with a vie;/ to the
^
relinquishment of extraterritorial rights.
The first meeting of the Commission was scheduled
for January 12, 1926. Delay had "been caused by the
disturbed political conditions, cessation of railv^ay
communication, and Chinese Insistence of nominal chairmanship
of the Commission. The Chinese Foreign Office had also
asked Kellogg to give the American delegates plenipotentiary
powers to oonclude definite agreements. Such power "would
thereby give China a tactical advantage in making permanent
Xm Forolj ... . j - Jlons , 1S25, I, p. 833.
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adjustments while general deliberation was in process.
The Secretary of State refused this request, stating that
definitive power would not be accorded until the Commission
had reported to the Government of the United States,
The Chinese Commission submitted a plan for
consideration. China was determined to motivate the course
of proceedings as much as she was able.
(1) Consular Jurisdiction; (2) trial of mixed
cases between Chinese and foreigners having
extraterritorial righta J (3) trial of cases
between foreigners having extraterritorial
rights and (a) foreigners having no extra-
territorial rights, (b) foreigners of countries
having treaty relations with China; (4) mixed
court 8; (5) quasi right of asylum in premises
occupied by foreigners and on foreign ships;
(6) issue of foreign nationality certificates
to Chinese citizens; (7) claim of foreigners to
exemption from taxation; and (8) special areas
(a) foreign settlements, (b) leased territory, ±
(c) Legation Quarter, Peking, (d) railway zones.
Although some of the delegates objected to a few
of the proposals in the list, p rtalning to taxation (7) and
special areas (8), Kellogg instructed the American delegates
to put no obstacle in the way of China* s presenting views
or data for consideration.
The Commission delegates presented their Governments
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, pp. 970-971.
with full reports of their work on September 16, 1926.
The American Department of State published the full report
that same November. China had wanted the first three parts
of the report kept from general publication because of
misapprehensions that might arise from the findings of the
Commission, but the Powers denied this request. The report
was divided into four parts:
Part I. Present practise of extraterritoriality
Part II. Laws and Judicial and prison systems of China
Part Hi Administration of Justice in China
2
Part IV. Recommendations.
The Commission, in making a general observation
on extraterritoriality, admitted that the present conception
was unfavorable. The system represented the conflict between
a growing Nationalistic spirit and expanding foreign interests
Thus the limitations on China* s sovereign rights were stressed
A study was made of the three Constitutions of the
Chinese Republic, examining provisions for the rights of
citizens and the guarantees of independent Judiciaries to
evaluate the laws which derived their validity from the
Xm Foreign delations , 1926, I, p. 983.
2 "Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China/
United States Department of State (Washington, 1926), p. 5.
Constitutions.
China was commended in the Ret>ort for p-enpral
principles of judicial reform that had been instigated to
carry out the provisions of the 1902 and 1903 treaties.
The results were discernable in a modern system of courts
with procedural and substantive law. However, the Commission
discovered important discrepancies in the modern legal
system. For a number of ancient laws and legal principles
continued in force, and negligent enforcement of new laws
restricted tVeir application. It was found that some
provisions of the law in connection with personal law, i.e.
concubinage and bonding of children, and the extensive power
2
of the magistrates, were still in existence. There were
eighteen hundred magistrates* courts in China compared with
one hundred and fifty modern courts. The greater part of
Chinese litigation was carried on in these ancient courts.
Few of the presiding officials in magistrates' courts were
legally trained. The right of legal counsel was often
denied and detention in civil cases was frequently allowed
—
-
,
———— —
—
1. "Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China/
United States Department of 3tate (Washington, 19^8), p. 30.
Ibid
. , p. S3.
Ibid.
,
p* 68.
9(3.
in these courts. Military and naval oourts had .juris-
diction over all cases in which servicemen and civilian
plaintiff 3 -/ere Involved. In time of emergency they had
Jurisdiction over all cases, held trial in camera, denied
le counsel, and permitted corporal punishment i to
six-hundred blows of the bamboo.^" The wide scope of
martial Jurisdiction, in view of the prevailing civil
strife, offered convincing evidence for the general
feeling among foreigners that they needed the security of
extraterritoriality. The Commission listed a number of
cases to show that the military authorities were arbitrarily
arresting and condemning civilians while the Commission
2
was in session.
Furthermore the delegates were unable to report
on the administration of Justice in police tribunals,
:-.-.{;! strates 1 MNKTt*, m& Bilttarj courts fet$aSSf of V *lr
inability to examine them. The Peking authorities refused
to allow the investigation of these tribunals because they
were listed under the Ministry of Interior and thereby
beyond the scope of the Commissioners* lnculries. The
1. "Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China
Department of atate , (Washington 1926), p. 82.
2. Ibid. , p. 96.
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Canton Government was stronger in its refusal. It would
not receive the Investigating committee on the grounds
that extraterritoriality should be immediately abolished. 1
The report concluded that it was, "well within
the range of moderation to state that in China at the
present time there is no effective security against
arbitrary action by the military authorities
,
in so
far as such security can be afforded by an effective function-
2
lng of the Chinese civil and Judicial authorities. H
Having completed its investigation, the Commission
presented recommendations to China and to the Powers holding
extraterritorial privileges in China. China was advised
to adopt specific measures that would lead to the improvement
of her Judicial system. The Powers were encouraged to help
China reform the Judiciary along the lines determined by
the Commission and to make feasible modifications in the
extraterritoriality system.
The Commission definitely decided against the
relinquishment of extraterritoriality per se. However, a
stimulus for the gradual relinquishment acknowledged in
1 "America and the Chinese Conflict," Congressional Direst
1927-1928
,
VI, VII (May, 1927), 150.
2. "Report of the Commission of Extraterritoriality in China,"
United States Department of State (Washington, 1926), p. 97.
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1903 and 1922 was produced by the recommendations In the
report. R. T. Pollard has suggested that the recommendations
were a defeat for China on the entire question of extra-
territoriality. For even if the Powers accepted the
recommendations of the Commission, they still retained the
right of determining if and x^hen these reforms had actually
been carried out."*" The report, then, became what Peking
had expected, a review of the judicial system in China.
of
Meanwhile another p aspect/judicial control was
being enacted by China and the Powers. Because of the
degree of foreign control, it was logical to associate
2
Mixed Courts in China with Extraterritoriality. The
Powers had violated a treaty right when they seized the
3
3hanghai International Mixed Court in 1911. Prior to 1911,
foreign and Chinese magistrates on the Court had been
appointed by Chinese authorities, the Shanghai taotal .
The action by the Powers could not be Justified legally, but
they maintained that the seizure had been to insure
administrative efficiency during the Revolution. However,
foreign control was not surrendered when the Republic was
established.
1. R. T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations , (New York, 1933),
p. 287.
2. H. 3. Qulgley, "Extraterritoriality in China," p. 55.
3. S. 3. Liu, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Decline,
(New York, 1925), p. 226.
The Chinese Oov< rnraent had asked the Pollers to
return the Shanghai Mixed Court to its control in 1922.
Reply by the diplomatic body had been postponed because of
the impending convocation of the Extraterritoriality
Commission for it was hoped that this body would decide the
isaue. Before the Commission met, it was evident that the
representatives of the Powers were anxious for the Court to
be returned to the Chinese. Though China had taken the
initiative in asking for return, the Powers favored the
grant because foreign control had become a basic cause for
resentment in China and the legal position of the Court was
Isolated. Foreign administration had become ineffective
because the Court's decisions were not recognized anywhere
else in China.
Hughes warned against a concession re the Mixed
Court that might give the impression of being the first
1
step toward the abolition of extraterritoriality. However,
Japan and Great Britain had taken a conciliatory attitude
toward rendering the Court to the Chinese and the American
State Department, unwilling to take individual action in
the matter, had agreed to begin negotiations alone those lines.
The Powers reached an agreement to return the
1. Foreign Relations , 1924, I, p. 524.
100.
Shanghai Mixed Court to the Klangsu Provincial Government
in 1926. The State Department maintained that the
Jurisdiction of the Court was not a treaty right, but had
been determined by an agreement among officials of Great
Britain, China, and the United States in 1869.
Negotiation throughout the years had ended in stalemate
because the Chinese insisted that the reconstituted court
be entirely Chinese, while the foreigners wanted it to
function with the administration of the International
Settlement. By July, however, both sides agreed upon
terms of rendition and secured the approval of the foreign
legations.
(a) In plaoe of the Mixed Court in the
International Settlement, Klangsu Provincial
Government will establish Shanghai Provisional
Court having similar Jurisdiction, (b) Chinese
laws and procedure will be applied except as
the latter shall be modified by mutual agree-
ment, (c) Assessors to be known as consuls'
deputies shall function in all cases required
by treaty and In criminal cases 'which directly
affect the peace and order of the International
Settlement." The Powers of the assessors to be
in effect those conferred by the treaty of 1880.
(d) Municipal police shall be detailed to
functions as Judicial police under orders of the
court. (e) Appeals in Mixed Court civil cases
shall be to Commission r for foreign Affairs and
the consul concerned , (f) All Judges to be
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, p. 1028.
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appointed by Kiangsu Provincial Government,
(g) Provision for a final settlement may-
be made With any Po Trer three years hence.
In the ensuing diplomatic struggle for treaty
revision, extraterritoriality assumed a misconstrued
2importance. It \*as associated with tariff autonomy, to
the detriment of the latter. MacMurray sax* through the
combination and was then able to enact a precise American
policy.
Of the two matters that of extraterritoriality
is ruled out by the fact that the Chinese have
not yet such laws or judicial organization as
would enable them to assume the function of
dispensing Justice where foreigners are
defendants. It is therefore premature to
consider the abandonment of extraterritoriality;
and in view of the importance with which that
subject has artificially been made to assume as
a political slogan among the Chinese it would be
dangerous to broach the subject in any way at
this time. 5
However, though the abolition of extraterritoriality
was denied, the United States acted in accordance with the
spirit of the Commission's recommendations and granted a
legal right to China. The Nationalist Government had
1.
2.
5.
Foreign Relations , 1926, I, pp. 1031-1032.
Foreign Bgle tion s, 1927, II, p. 364.
Ibid., p. 364.
3U .
objected to the presence of consular representatives at
trials in Chinese Courts.* The United States considered
the protest at once, advised other Powers of its action
and forthwith acquiesced:
....with a view of carrying out the provisions
of the first sentence of section 2 of article 4
of the recommendations contained in the report
of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in
China, purpose (except in unusual circumstances)
to ex rcise the right granted by article 4 of
the Sino-Araerican commercial treaty of 1880
Insofar as relates to an American official
watching proceedings, .... in cases brought by
American plaintiffs against Chinese defendants....
This action by the United States was complete
departure from that in 1922 when Hughes expressed the
American policy re extraterritoriality. He had wanted the
Commission to meet with the predetermined plan of using the
findings of that body as further proof of the necessity for
any action that the Powefrs might devise to protect foreign
life and property In China. Accordingly, with this as a
main purpose, the United States was willing to hasten the
convention of the Extraterritoriality Commission.
When Kellogg became Secretary of State, a change
in our policy, more responsive to Chinese Nationalist aims,
was dlscernable. H. 3. Quigley, writing in 1926, condemned
1. Foreign Relations , 1927, II, p. 467
2. Ibid. , p. 469.
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the Powers 1 treatment of the question of extraterritoriality.
He felt that it was entitled to consideration on its own
merits and should not be determined by oonsideratio m of a
non-Juridioial character. This was an expression of a
growing opinion in America that demanded treaty revision
along liberal lines.
The Commission admitted the weakness of the
extraterritorial system. However, it concluded that this
weakness was not so detrimental to the protection of foreign
life and property as Chinese Judicial control would be.
Concerning the Nationalist demand for the abolition of
extraterritoriality, China experienced defeat from the
report of the Copimlssion. However, tangible gain can be
seen from the establishment of the trend toward gradual
abolition of the privilege based on the recommendations
made in the report. To illustrate the Intention of the
Powers to practice these recommendations, the United States
immediately complied with the Chinese request that consular
representatives be withdrawn from trials in Chinese Court3.
1. H. S. t^ulgley, "Extraterritoriality in China," p. 68.
104
CHAPTER IV,
COMMUNICATIONS
Of all means of communications developments in
China, the wireless concern will be the subject of this
study. International competition in this field is
representative of the administrative problem of
communications between Treaty Powers and China.
In a memorandum distributed by the Chinese
delegation to the Washington Conference, "The Chinese
Government ask that the Conference take action that will
lead to the immediate abolition or surrender to the
Chinese Government of all electrical means of communications,
including wireless stations, now maintained on Chinese
soil without the consent of the Chinese Government."
China claimed that she had adequate facilities
for wireless com-nunication and that it was unnecessary for
foreign nations to maintain their own stations. There were
approximately twenty foreign wireless stations in China
that had been erected by the Powers without the consent
2
of the Chinese Government. The foreign operation of
wireless was nothing but a political measure representing
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," Sen te
Documents , vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1922),
p. 505.
2. Ibid., p. 506.
105
an Infringement on China's administrative and territorial
integrity.
When the Conference discussed the Chinese
memorandum, two claims were considered; (1) that a
distinction be drawn between official and commercial
messages and (2) that the question of wave lengths be
regulated by mutual agreement. 1 Hughes, as did other
representatives, told the Conference that the United States
maintained wireless stations only to the extent provided
in the Boxer protocol of 1901, i.e. in connection with
2troop stations and to keep communications open to the sea.
The United States agreed with the Chinese Government that
the legation stations should be used for official business
only and not for commercial purposes. The importance of
wireless communication lay in the fact that there were only
a limited number of wave lengths available. The United
States had added the discussion of wireless to the agenda
in an effort to apply international co-operation to the
problem. Because of the highly complicated technical aspect
of wireless, the delegates agreed not to proceed with the
subject of wave lengths beyond a practical point.
0
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Armament,
M Senate Documents,
vol. X, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1922), p. 520.
2. Ibid., p. 517.
3. Ibid., p. 525.
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The subject of wireless stations in Chin* was
then referred to a subcommittee which reported a general
resolution of five parts. By unanimous agreement it was
decided to apply the principle of the Open Door to the
fourth part of this resolution.
(4) Questions regarding radio stations in
leased areas will be discussed by the
Chinese Government and the Government
concerned.^
Mr. Sze of the Chinese delegation declined the
suggestion of a special commission to study wireless
telegraphy. In China, wire telegraphy w*s a government
monopoly and for this reason China would rather regard it
as purely Internal policy. The Chinese delegate added that
the Resolution adopted had been the policy of eight Powers
and thnt China's policy was as follows:
The Chinese delegation takes tills occasion
formally to declare that the Chinese Government
does not recognize or concede the right of any
foreign power or of the nationals thereof to
install or operate, without its express consent,
radio stations in legation grounds, settlements,
concessions, leased territories, railway areas
or other similar areas.
1. "Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1 Senate Documents,
vol. X, 6?th Cong. 2d Sess. (Washington, 1922), p. 548.
2. Ibid., p. 718.
3. Ibid., p. ?32
107.
The committee of communications experts then
concluded with recommendations which American, British,
French, and Japanese radio interests could follow but the
Conference did not take decisive action regarding wireless
communication.
(1) British, French and Japanese co-operative scheme
of private radio interests with the consent of
China; no monopoly or exclusive privilege and
subject to Chinese laws; complete station near
Peking (Mitsui).
(2) American expert plan for trans-Pacific service
to be Chinese-American entity based on the Federal
Telegraph Company concession.
(3) Traffic arrangements to carry out provisions (1)
and (2) to be at liberty of governments concerned.
(4) Chinese Ministry of Coflimuni cations to authorize
foreign stations that handle ship to shore
coramuni cati ons
.
(5) China National Wireless Telegraph Company to
extend its scope for best development of resources
in China; prevent monopoly and conflict in China.
(6) Four cowers reco.amend that arrangement be made with
cable companies to continue same rates for a period
after expiration of existing contracts in 19o0.1
While the Conference was in session competition
among international radio Interests In China was progressing.
The American State Department had made a committment to an
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American wireless concern in 1921. That year, the
Federal Telegraph Company, Incorporated in California,
had signed a contract with the Peking Government providing
for the construction of a radio station in Shanghai with
secondary stations at Canton, Harbin, and Peking for wire-
less overseas communication.
The American Legation had asked for Department
support of the Federal contract because it felt that it
might conflict with Marconi (British), Mitsui (Japanese),
and other monopolistic cable agreements. The State
Department, opposed to monopolies In China, had received
assurances that the Federal contract was not monopolistic
nor a hindrance to equal opportunity. Accordingly the
Department gave its support. There was another reason for
diplomatic support of the Federal contraot. The American
Government wanted control of direct communication between
the United States and China and planned to use the Federal
Company^ concession to carry It out.
To help finance the Federal concession, the State
Department persuaded the Radio Corporation of America to
lend financial assistance.
1
The Radio Corporation had given
support to a scheme for international control that had been
1. Foreign Relations, 1922, I, p. 849.
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advanced at the Conference but expressed willingness to
meet the wishes of the State Department concerning trans-
pacific communications. The two companies proposed to
set up a new company to execute the China contract of the
Federal Company. Both the Federal Company and the Radio
Corporation would have an equal share In the control of
the new company. The Telegraph Company and the Radio
Corporation both knew that the State Department would not
determine the legality or commercial value of the project,
but they wanted the assurance of diplomatic support. The
State Department had passed on the Federal contract in
1921 and it now repeated a warning against the creation of
a monopoly by the Radio Corporation in the ensuing
transaction. The Navy Department, also, evidenced interest
in the concern. It was anxious for the Federal Telegraph
Company to retain its identity to assure the continuation
of the manufacture and sale of certain apparatus.
1 Such
precautionary measures would indicate that the American
Government was opposed to the scheme for either a wireless
combination or a private monopoly in China.
The American Minister and the Peking Ministry of
Communications urged the State Department to make the
1. Foreign Relations , 1922, I, p. 851.
110.
Federal Company hasten in the execution of its contract
because the British, French, and Japanese wireless
interests had informed China in 1922 that they would soon
present an agreement that they had reached on a wireless
policy. Meanwhile the Radio Corporation and the Federal
Company were carrying on negotiations in strict secrecy
because of the Radio Corporation's close affiliations with
2
the international radio concerns. However, in October the
Japanese filed protest against the Federal contract on the
basis of the monopolistic clause in their Mitsui contract
which enabled them to establish and operate all overseas
radio service in China to the exclusion of all other
nationals interested in wireless communication.
This protest carried enough weight to cause the
Peking Ministry of Communications to refuse to sanction the
Federal Company's negotiations with the Radio Corporation
on the grounds that: (1) a Parliamentary attack would
probably result if public opinion decided that the Ministry
3
had made a new contract; and (2) the Japanese objection.
1. Foreign Relations , 192;?, I, p. 854.
2. Ibid., 1925, I, p. 855.
3. Ibid., 783.
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China in the face of international pressure was reverting
to a policy of delay. Schwerin, President of the Federal
Company, told the State Department that within two months
the land near Shanghai selected for the radio station
would be flooded for the rice crop, and that he believed
that the Chinese authorities were fully aware that work
would then be impossible for the remainder of the year. 1
Reacting to China's delay, the United States
announced that it supported the Federal contract on the
principle of the Open-Door because it concerned, "the
Interpretation to be given to the principle of equality of
2
commercial and industrial opportunity in China,...
"
However, the State Department had to fee the additional
complication of international interests in the Federal
Company's contract.
The Powers who were trying to form the radio
consortium for China first had to dispose of the Mitsui
claim and the Federal contract. Hughes considered the
advisability of entering an agreement among American,
British, French, and Japanese radio interests on the basis
of the experts' recommendation s at the Washington Confex^enoe.
1. Foreign Relations , 1023, I, p. Vb5.
2. Ibid
. , p. 788.
£. Ibid., p. 797.
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Tills plan reserved the Chinese-American field as an entity
to be developed through the Federal Contract and thus
trans-Pacific control by the United States would be
insured. Hughes thought that our entrance in the
consortium would facilitate the execution of Federal
contract. When the British asked him if the United 3tates
would meet the Japanese objections to the recommendations
of the experts, he replied that "while not unwilling that
its nationals should co-operate by means of appropriate
traffic agreements and other business arrangements with any
international combination which might be established for
the development of radio communications between China and
other countries, it is not prepared to become a party to
a combination for that purpose, desiring in particular to
retain independence of action with respect to communications
between the United States and China. 1,1 Thus he carefully
indicated that our entrance, if at all, would be carefully
qualified. China had not given its opinion on the
consortium, and Hughes tried to enact a policy that seemingly
agreed with the Chinese desires.
The Japanese Government had objected to the
opinion of the American experts in regard to the execution
1. Fo,-r.lyn tlons , 1923 .Itfp. 823-824.
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of the Federal contract. Japanese propaganda went into
action to demand that the Chinese (Jovernment cancel the
contract. The Japanese (Mitsui) station was in financial
straits and had been anxious for the Federal Company to
buy up its concession. Sohwerin did not believe that his
company could buy out the Hitsui and feared that if they
tried to unite the two the Japanese would insist upon
sharing the stations.**" That arrangement would endanger
American control of trans-Pacific communication. Failing
in this respect, the Japanese presented a counter proposal
th.t the principles of consortium be applied to the Mitsui
2
and Federal contracts. In this way, the contracts would
be pooled and superceded by a loan agreement for wireless,
comparable to the railway loans.
The Department felt that it might have to look
to the Japanese proposal as the only alternative if the
Radio Corporation and the Federal Company did not setf.e
3
an internal dispute and complete their original scheme.
Disturbed conditions within the American interests caused
1. Foreign delations , 1924, I, p. 571.
2m Foreign Relations , 192b ,1 p. 892.
3. Ibid., p. 897.
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Hughes to further reconsider his attitude toward the
consortium. Before such a course became imminent, however,
the United States presented a plan for the mutual trans-
mission of traffic between the Federal and Mitsui stations.
Japan called this traffic proposal a breach of China's
administrative integrity and unfair treatment of the other
Powers concerned. She held that it violated the Mitsui
contract and Indicated that the Federal Company would have
exclusive control of all radio stations to be constructed
by the company as well as control of radio service between
the United States and China.
The Peking Government now took a defensive-
position by informing both the United States and Japan
that they would hafe to adjust their differences before
2
China could consider fulfillment of the Federal contract.
In such action Kellogg saw the repudiation of the oontract
and violation of the Open-Door principle. The Chinese
Minister for Foreign Affairs denied that a question of
principle was involved. He declared it was simply ft
practical matter of overcoming the Japanese objection.
However, shortly after the Peking Government gave erery
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 902.
2. Ibid., p. 913.
evidence of cancelling both the American and Japanese
contracts. There was little consolation for the Federal
Company to know that the Mitsui contract would also be
cancelled. For by the terms of the Japanese contract,
the Peking station would remain in Japanese hands because
construction had been completed.
1
The cancellation was
carried through at a secret cabinet meeting August 24,
1920.
The Peking Government immediately after
cancellation proposed a Joint Anerl can-Japanese loan to
the Chinese Government to develop its wireless system.
The American representatives felt that Japanese interest
behind the proposal to draw the Anurleans from vested
contract rights into negotiation in which they might be at
2
a disadvantage. The Chinese Government had not answered
l-acMurray's request for a statement on the contr ct, and
until it was forthcoming the American Government refused to
recognize the cancellation. The quick action of the
s
American Minister saved the Federal contract.
The Peking Mini ter told Kellogg that 'laoMurray
had sent his government a comraunic tion that was interpreted
1. Foreign delations , 1925, I, p. 915.
2. Ibid . , p. 919.
3. Ibid. , p. 920.
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as meaning that the action of the United States in the
coning Special Conference would be governed by the
attitude of the Chinese Government toward the Federal
Wireless contract.* Kellogg agreed with MacMurray and
expressed his Governments disappointment in China's
disregarding the policy of the Open- Do or. China, he
pointed out, was failing to support the policy at the same
time that she was appealing to the Powers to release her
from conventional tariffs and extraterritorial treaties.
Some opinion in Peking regarded our insistence on the
Cpen-Door policy as mere bluff. The State Department,
though determined to have the Federal contract recognized,
did not want the particular problem to become a focus for
2
our general policy in China.
The Peking Government acceded to the desire of
the United States but only as an emergency measure in the
light of two evils. President Tuan assured MacMurray that
the contract would be upheld.
0
Tuan expressed his
Governments adherence to the principle of the Open- Door
1. Foreign Relations , 1925, I, p. 922.
2. Ibid.
,
p. 927.
3. Loc. olt.
11?
but he recognized the potential threat of Japan In
Manchuria and felt that he had to appease it. 1 He
suggested a tripartite conversation to fulfill the Federal
contract and to assure Japan that the Shanghai station
•ould not Interfere with the Japanese system of Bjnral radio
communications. The American Government informed Peking
that it would enter discussion when the Federal contract
was in course of performance.
The State Department was anxious to conclude
this long standing controversy but held out for its
original terms. Kellogg was impressed with the argument
that the proposed radio consortium would alleviate financial
disability in connection with wireless In China. "ac 'urray
informed his chief that he thought the real point of
Japanese opposition to the expert* s recommendations was
this, "they would prefer China to be served by a station
under their control though it is inadequate for trans-
Pacific work, rather than have an adequate station built
2
near Shanghai by Americans or any other nationality.
*
MacMurray in conversation with Saburl, Japanese
dele ate to the Tariff Conference, queried hlia as to why
1 . Loc. clt .
;?. Fo-el.^n Relations , 1926, I, p. 1044.
118.
his Government was vitally Interested In a oomraerclal
enterprise. 1 He answered that there was some opinion in
Japan that the American Navy«s interest in the Federal
contract was concerned with a view to future war with
Japan. Upon denial of amour propre by the United States
the Japanese delegate implied a willingness to reconsider
the American proposal for a traffic arrangement between the
2American and Japanese stations. Saburi declared that
the question had formerly been studied from the political
rather than from the economic point of view. Thus a point
seemed to have been reached where accord might evolve and
the consortium plan which had not been accepted by the
Chinese could be discarded.
The Chinese Government had never replied to the
3
Japanese consortium proposal. A definite statement, then,
might have directed the course of the dispute. Now dis-
satisfaction was seen on all sides. J. C. Harbord of the
Radio Corporation appealed to Kellogg.
1. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, p. 1044.
2. Ibid . , p. 1045.
3. Ibid., p. 1051.
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....It is unnecessary, possibly unprsteful, to
reiterate our hope that the State Department
will push this matter to a conclusion at a very
early date,. Our loyalty to its position on the
"Open- Door has cost us elrendy half a million
dollars in money paid out which sum is increasing
by a little less than -$9,000 esch month. q are
quite convinced that a consortium for wireless
communication in China would be very much better
for China than no wireless communication at all.
We very much appreciate the psrnest sun or
t
which our Federal project has in the past had
from the State Deportment and respectfully urge
that there be no relaxation in such support.
We do feel, however, that the moment that the
State Department becomes convinced that there
is no liklihoori of the Chinese poing forward with
our contract, no political objection to a
consortium should be allowed to stsnd in the way
of our naklng arrangements as have been open to
us for a lonp time.-*-
Upon the advice of 14acMurray, the American
Government proceeded with caution in requesting China for
2
a reply concerning the federal contract. He stressed the
Open-Door policy in toto. For the Chinese Government, in
its present Nationalistic frame of mind, would never grant
another contract as favorable as the Federal contract.'"
reklng, however, did not respond.
1.
2.
3.
Fo, eiffl Relations , 19^6, I, p. 1052.
Ibid.
,
p. 1063.
Loo. oit.
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The British Government viewed the Federal
contract as a monopoly of the same type as the Mitsui.
They specifically objected to China 1 s pledging the whole
of the surplus revenues of the Chinese Railways as security
for the loan contract. 1 The general tenor of the British
protest was that the individual action of the United States
was oontravenous to its declared policy in 1918 concerning
consortium investment in China. The British memorandum
quoted a note from the United States sent to the British,
French, and Japanese October 8, 1918.
The proposal Of the United States contemplated
that industrial, as well as administrative loans
should be Included in the new arrangement for the
reason that, in practise, the line of demarcation
between various classes of loans often is not
easy to draw. Both alike are essential fields
for legitimate financial enterprise and both alike
should be removed from the sphere of unsound
speculation and of destructive competition. The
intention of this Government was to suggest as a
means to that end, that the Interested Governments
should, by common consent, endeavor so to broaden
the member ship in the newly formed national groups
that all financial firms of good standing interested
in such loans might be Included in the respective
groups and should withhold their support from
independent financial operations without previous
agreement of the interested Governments.
Our support of the Federal contract and refusal to sanction
the consortium of radio interests denied this note.
1. Foreign Relations , 1926, I, p. 1070.
2. Ibid., p. 1071.
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The Peking Government inferred to MaoMurray
that It might honor the Federal contract in exchange for
an early recognition of its regime. 1 Macllurray refused
this offer, possibly because it might interfere with his
negotiations with the Canton regime concerning a tariff
treaty. He felt that the Peking refusal to acquiesce on
the grounds of the Open-Door principle meant a complete
denial of the Federal contract and thus urged his Depart-
ment to negotiate with Sun Ch'uan-fang who controlled
2
Shanghai. Kellogg refused this suggestion because he
felt that ultimate fulfillment of the radio contract would
3
need the support of the Central Government at Peking.
In regard to policy for private enterprise, Kellogg did
not follow MacMurray's opinions as willingly as he did
for tariff and extraterritoriality policies.
Portly after, the Department replied to the
Japanese invitation to enter the consortium. The United
States maintained its original stand against the consortium
and for the traffic arrangement between the Federal and
1. ForelRn delations , 1926, I, pp. 1077-1078.
3. Ibid., p. 1077.
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:'itsui stations. Our note proposed a conference of
u
Chinese, Japanese, and American radio representatives to
meet in New York to arrange a solution of the present
difficulties. 1 However, the United States did not consider
'chat the proposed conference -^ould be an excuse for further
delay by Peking In executing the Federal contract.
Japanese delayed answering the American
request for the r-tiio conference and this delay caused the
Chinese to withhold acceptance and the Radio Corporation
to consider withdrawing its support of the Federal Company.
The United States tried to convince Japan that, *it ought
to be possible for governments to allow the private
corporations who were ^oing to be connected with the
operation of radio between China and Japan and the United
States to get to-gether as private individuals for the
purpose of finding some plan of operation and of agreeing
among them -elves on how they could carry out their
proposals,...."3 tfiMMB the >rlvate interests had agreed
upon a plan it would then be time for the Governments
concerned to consider whether or not they would approve of
1. gorelgg Relations, 1926, I, 1082.
a, foreign delations , 1927, II, p. 472.
3. ibid., p. 477.
thfl plan sr-reed upon.
Jfman presented B memorandum of their opinion as
the solution of the wireless problem, November 1927, which
proposed cancellation of both Mitsui and federal contracts.
(1) Japan and the United states voluntarily cancel
Mitsui anrt Feflpral contracts.
(2) China establish her own station at Shanghai
—
Federal Telegraph Company supply material.
(3) China make loan contracts to Japanese and
American companies.
(4) China fniarantee not to ^rant any foreign country
or its nationals, exclusive right of operation
of wireless telegraphy in China.
(6) Tri-Government Conference to make detailed
arrangements on first four proposals.
*
The American (Government did not sanction the
Japanese pronosal but offered to let the American radio
interests decide its value for themselves. " *&€ Stnte
Department merely stipulated that the right of controlling
direct communication between the United States and China
and the denial of a r^dlo monopoly should be Maintained.
The Department expected the American interests to uphold
these stipulations at the proposed trl-partite conference
1. Foreign Rein t ions , 1927, II, p. 472.
2. Ifrlc. , p. 479.
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when it convened. TVrever, letting the American interests
accept or reject the Japanese proposal which specifically
denied the Federal contract constituted tacit diplomatic
withdrawal of the support of the Federal Telegraph
Company.
In the development of International competition
to secure wireless contracts in China during this period
the main issues at stake were never clearly defined. The
A.^.rlc&n State Department had given support to the Federal
telegraph Company in 1921 before wireless telep;rephy was
dlfcusced at the Washington Conference. W. W. Willoughby
maintained that nothing much was done in regard to wirelees
communication in 1922. In this stud", the recommendations
that the experts presented at Washington are basic aspects
of the wireless controversy. The State Department expressed
willingness to enter the radio consortium on the be sis of
the e recon nendr-tions but Japanese objections defeated any
intentions it might have had toward entering the consortium.
After the Washington Conference the United States
had to f ce the conflict between continuing the support of
the Federal concession and of opposing the radio consortium
because the Peking Government; did not give its approval.
1. '. Villouehby, China at the Conference (Baltimore,
1922), p. 157.
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The conflict was heightened by trouble Within the
American r<3dio interests. The Federal Company, badked by
the State Department, was unable to work in accord with
the Radio Corporation which had decided leanings toward
the International radio consortium.
Anxious to end the long controversy, the State
Department adopted the policy of allowing private radio
interests in Japan, the United States, and China to
negotiate with the Chinese Government. The constructive
work of the Department in regard to the wireless controversy
was the f at that the An* rican Government supported its
national's contract until 19H7 when the chances that China
would soon have a stable government wore practically
certain. withdrawal of diplomatic support of the Federal
contract was virtual recognition of China 1 s autonomous right
to wireless control.
State Department action during the wireless
oontroversy was In keeping with American foreign policy of
the era. "Dollar Diplomacy" i-ras In the process of being
terminated in Latin America. Mexico and Nicaragua experienced
internal stability from effective moral support by the
United states. ±he American public was becoming anti-
imperialistic and demanded that its government treat all
nation a as equals.
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CHAPTER V.
CONCLUSION
Since 1842 China had had only nominal control
of many of her administrative functions. Actually foreign
governments and their nationals had maintained control by
treaty rights and private contracts. Though the foreign
control of the tariff, courts, and communications differs
in degree, B semblance of similarity is dlscernable in a
study of the problems from 1922-1928.
All three problems were discussed at the
Washington Conference, though in the light of China's
requests little specific action was taken in 1922.
Provisions was made for special conferences to consider
the questions of China's tariff and Judicial system.
A technical group presented recommendations for considera-
tion among international wireless interests in China.
China took the initiative at the Conference in
presenting her ten points for procedure. Defeated when the
Powers adopted the Root Resolutions as blanket policy,
China persistently made clear to the representatives just
what her ambitions and desires were in regard to these
administrative problems. The Chinese delegation asked for
tariff autonomy, wireless control, and immediate action
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toward the eventual relinquishment of extraterritoriality.
It is Interesting to note the divergent view of
the meaning of administrative and territorial integrity.
China declared at Washington that the problems in this
study constituted administrative integrity. The Powers
agreed to uphold that Integrity but did not take measures
to guarantee it other than announcing integrity in
principle.
China gradually became strong enough to persuade
the United States to grant tariff autonomy in 1928. And
although she failed to gain complete control of her courts
and communications, she had established a precedent which
should, it would seem, ultimately lead her to this control.
In gaining tariff autonomy, China was aided by
the American Minister J. V. A. MacMurray who has not
received the credit and recognition due him for the part
he played in American diplomacy at this time. However,
from the State Department correspondence it is evident
that MacMurray guided the entire course of diplomacy which
prevented the United States from recognizing a Chinese
Government controlled by militarism or one influenced by
Communism.
The evidence would suggest that China would not
have gained tariff autonomy in 1928 if it had not been for
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the Chinese Nationalist Movement. The Nationalist's
note to MacMurray condemning the ill-conceived American
policy, carried more diplom tic weight for the success
of tariff autonomy than the Peking regime's threat to
abrogate all customs treaties at the Special Tariff
Conference.
A thought might be well advanced that China
would not have gained tariff autonomy if the:"e had been no
civil war caused by the Nationalist agitation. The Southern
faction continuously planned a return to the po:-rer it had
given up in 1912 and stimulated civil war throughout the
post-Revolutionary period to attain it. 1 The Nationalist
military victory contributed to the recognition of Nanking
by the United States. For it seems certain from this
study that MacMurray would have awaited developments much
longer if necessary and that he would never grant tariff
autonomy to a Peking Government representing China but
influenced by Japan and ifeakened by military anarohy.
Of the three demands made by China concerning
administration, tariff autonomy was the only one granted
in 1928 because it was used as the reward for the establish-
ment of the Nanking Government. In the civil strife bet\*een
1. H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNalr, Far Eastern International
Relations (Cambridge, 1931), p. 670.
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the North and South, both side3 wanted tariff autonomy
and the resulting increase in revenue much more than
control of courts and communications.
The policy of International co-operation among
,Powers in China was never strictly maintained. The
United States made efforts to abide by it in principle
and practise until 1925. Treaty revision with China alone
was contemplated after that because of the dissention
among the Covers. However, in 1927 the United States was
willing to depart from the co-operative scheme for a new
reason. Kellogg feared that an identic note to apply
sanctions against the Nationalists for the Nanlsing outrage
would be detrimental to the strength of the moderate
element in the Party. It was this moderate Nationalist
faction with whom the American Government wanted to
negotiate a customs treaty of equality and reciprocity.
When this plan was acted upon in 1928 the co-operative
policy immediately became obsolete.
Professor Toynbee declared that the Nine Power
Treaty of the Washington Conference became obsolete when
Kellogg failed to mention it in his statement of January
27, 1927.
1
Nor did the United States inform the other
1. CP. Howland, Survey of American Fo-eiftn Rel"Ur,na
(New Haven, 1930), p. 142.
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Washington Conference members of Its intention to grant
tariff autonomy to China until the day before the treaty
1
was signed.
There Is a general theory that a line of
continuity exists in the American Far Eastern Policy.
It- is an expression of idealism built upon the expectation
of commercial expansion. The interest of the State
Department followed American enterprise in China. However,
largely from the progressive diplomacy of American statesmen,
the policy of helping China establish a strong efficient
government became a separate entity.
John Marshall, American Minister in 1853, stated
the ideal thusly:
It is my opinion that the highest interest of
the United States are involved In sustaining
China—maintaining order here, and gradually
engrafting on this worn out stock the healthy
principles which give life and health to
governments rather than to see China become
the theater of widespread anarchy and
g
ultimately the prey of European ambition.
John Hay, imbued with the idea of commercial
• enterprise in China, announced the Open-Door policy and
1 ' 1 ' " . i »
,
i i
.
i «
1. C. P. Howland, Survey of American Fofreifrn Relations , p. 142.
2. H. B. Mor3e, and H. P. MacNair, Far Sastern International
Relations, r>. 174.
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bro ight forth Hie moral obligation fir3t stated by John
Marshall, of preserving the territorial and administrative
integrity of China. Wllsonian idealism found expression
in China when the American banking group withdrew from
the Six Power Consortium and again at Paris when America
tried to uphold China's Shantung claim at the Pe;;ce
Conference. Kellogg* 3 moral influence doctrine picked
up the thread of Idealism. Recognition of the Nanking
Gov> rnraent by the United States was a source of strength
enabling China to assume a position of equality among
nations of the world.
The Japanese diplomacy of this period presents
thought for contemplation. The Japanese were quite
obviously using obstructionist tactics at the Tariff
Conference in the matter of implementing the proposed
Washington sur taxes. %aln, the Federal Telegraph
Company 1 a contract failed to go into effect largely because
of Japanese Influence at Peking and in the international
radio concern. The results of this study would seem to
indicate that the United States felt that Japanese
influence in Northern China was as detrimental to the
establishment of a representative Chinese Oov rnment as
the Communistic control in the South.
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In evaluating evidence, it could be assumed
that the United States neutralized the Japanese
successful influence over Chinese administration by
supporting the banking Government which was violently
anti-Japanese. The ultimate result of fo ei^n control
in China lias not been decided as yet. The problems
treated here were merely part of a movement that
exists to-day. In brief it is the strug-gle to
establish territorial and administrative sovereignty
in China.
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APPENDIX I.
CHRONOLOGY OF THk CHINESE REVOLUTION *
October 30, 1911 Formal Beginning
January 1, 1912 Inauguration of Sun Yat-sen as Provisional
President of China at banking.
February 12, 1912 Abdication of Manchus and Succession of
Yuan Shi-K^ai at Peking.
1912 - 1916 Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'alst Peking.
1916 - 1917 Presidency of Li Yuan-hung at Peking.
1917 - 1918 Presidency of Feng Kuo-chang at teking
1918 - 1922 Presidency of Hu Shlh-chang at Poking.
1922 - 1923 Second Presidency of Ki Yuan-hung at Peking.
1923 - 1924 Presidency of Tao Kun at Peking;.
1924 - 1926 Provisional Government of Taun Chi-jui
at Peking.
1926 - 1928 Dictatorship of Chang Tso-lin at Peking
From: A. N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution (Cambridge,
1931), p. 390.
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1917 - 1925 Independent Revolutionary Government of
3un Yat-3en at Canton.
1925 - 1926 Nationalist Government at Canton.
1926 - 1927 Nationalist Government at Hankow.
1927 - 1928 Nationalist Government at Nanking.
1928 - Presidency of Chiang K'ai-shek at
Nanking.
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APPENDIX II.
RECOMMENDATION OP THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
EXTRATERRITORIALITY*
I.
The administration of Justice with respect to the
civilian population in China must be entrusted to a Judiciary
which shall be effectively protected against any unwarranted
interference by the executive or other branches of the
Government, whether civil or military.
II.
The Chinese Government should adopt the following
program for the improvement of the existing Itgali Judicial
and prison systems of China:
1. It should consider Parts II and III of this report
relating to the laws and to the Judicial, police,
and prison systems, with a view to making such
amendments and taking such action as may be
necessary to meet the observations they made.
2. It should complete and put into force the
following laws:
(1) Civil code.
"Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China,
Peking September 16, 1926"
.
United States Department of State
(Washington, 1926)
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(2) Commercial code (including negotiable
instruments laws, maritime law and
insurance law).
(3) Revised criminal code.
(4) Banking law.
(5) Bankruptcy law.
(6) Patent law.
(7) Land expropriation law.
(8) Law concerning notaries public.
3. It should establish and maintain a uniform system
for the regular enactment, promulgrtion and
reclssion of laws, so that there may be no uncertainty
as to the laws of China.
4. It should extend the system of modern courts, modern
prisons and modern detention-houses with a view
to the elimination of the magistrates* courts and
of the old-style prisons and detention-house I
.
5. It should make adequate financial provision for
the maintenance of courts, detention houses and
prisons and their personnel.
III.
It is suggested that, prior to the reasonable
compliance with all the recommendations above
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mentioned taut After the principal Items thereof
have been c rried out, the powers concerned, If
so desired by the Chinese Government, Bight
consider the abolition of extraterritoriality
according to such proves l^e scheme (whether
geographica, partial, or otherwise) as may be
agreed upon.
IV.
Pending the abolition of extraterritoriality, the
Governments of the powers oon corned should consider Part I
of this report with a view to meeting the observations they
m de, and with the oo operation of tne Chinese Government
wherever neoessary, should make certain modifications in
the existing systems and pr-ctlse of extraterritoriality
as follows:
1. Application of Chinese Laws
The powers oonoerned should administer, so far
as practicable, in their extraterritorial or consular courts
such laws and regulations of China as thev ma.v deeL1 11
proper to adopt.
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2. illxed Gases and Mixed Courts
As a general rule mixed cases between nationals
of the powers concerned as plaintiffs and persons under
Chinese Jurisdiction as defendants should be tried bef 9 e
the modern Chinese courts (3hen P»an ?»lng) without the
presence of a foreign assessor to watch the proceedings or
otherwise participate. With regard to the existing special
mixed courts, their organization and procedure should, as
far as the special conditions in the settlements and
concessions warrant, be brought more into accord with the
organization and procedure of the mod. rn Chinese Judicial
system. Lawyers who are nationals of extraterritorial
powers and who are qualified to appear before the extra-
territorial or consular courts should be permitted, subject
to the laws .and regulations governing Chinese lawyers, to
represent clients, foreign or Chinese, in all mixed oases.
No examination should be required as a qualification for
practice in such oases.
3. Nationals of gxtra territorial Powers
(a) The extraterritorial powers should correct certain
abuses which have arisen through the extension of
foreign protection to Chinese as well as to business
and shipping interests the actual ownership of which
is wholly or mainly Chinese.
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(b) Tiie extraterritorial powers which do not now
require compulsory periodical registration of
their nationals in. China should make provision
for such registration at definite Intervals.
4. Judicial Assistance
Necessary arrangements should be made in regard
to Judicial assistance (including coiaLiissions rogatoires)
between the Chinese authorities and the authorities of the
extraterritorial powers and between the authorities of
the extraterritorial power! themselves, e.g. :
(a) All agreements between foreigners and persons under
Chinese Jurisdiction which provide for the settlement
of civil matters by arbitration should be recognized,
and the awards made in pursuance thereof should be
enforced, by the extraterritorial or consular courts
In the oase of persons under their Jurisdiction,
except when in the opinion of the competent court,
the decision is contrary to public order or good
morals.
(b) Satisfactory arrangements should be made between
the Chinese Government and the powers concerned
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for the prompt execution of judgments, sumnonses and
warrants of arrest or search, concerning persons under
Chinese Jurisdiction, duly issued by the Chinese courts
and certified by the competent Chinese authorities
and vice versa.
5. Taxation
Pending the abolition of extraterritoriality,
the nationals of the powers concerned should be required
to pay such taxes as may be prescribed in laws regulations
duly promulgated by the competent authorities of the Chinese
Government and recognized by the poweVi concerned as
applicable to their nationals.
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